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Corporate defined-benefit (DB) pension sponsors in the US are increasingly on a path of “derisking” 
– by moving pension assets away from equities and towards fixed-income securities that better 
match the obligations, or by transferring obligations off their balance sheets entirely, via 
settlements with insurance companies or lump-sum payouts to beneficiaries. In this study, we 
examine whether the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”) served as a driver of pension 
derisking. Examining behavior in the window between the TCJA’s announcement and its lower 
tax rate going into effect, we document that sponsors with stronger incentives to derisk their 
pensions tend to contribute more into their plans in that window, while deductions can still be 
taken at the higher tax rate – specifically, sponsors expecting large and uncertain contribution 
requirements for pensions in the future, facing high regulatory costs to maintaining plans, and with 
competing demands on cash flows. Examining behavior after the TCJA goes into effect, we 
document that the firms with the largest TCJA-triggered contributions also engage in more 
derisking subsequently, both by shifting asset allocations and by transferring obligations to other 
parties. In sum, our findings point to the TCJA having acted as a trigger for what could be a 
fundamental reorganization of the DB pension landscape in the US. 
Keywords: TCJA; defined-benefit plans; voluntary contributions; derisking; pension asset 
allocation; pension settlements or buyouts 






Defined Benefit (DB) pensions are an economically significant source of retirement 
income in the United States (US). About 37 million private sector workers rely on one of the 
25,000 DB plans sponsored by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) for retirement 
income. 1  
A key feature of DB plans, which differentiates them from defined contribution (DC) plans, 
is that the responsibility for funding future benefits falls primarily on the company sponsoring the 
plan (“sponsor”). As benefits are often due far into the future and subject to myriad uncertainties2, 
a DB plan sponsor is exposed to a range of risks. Underfunded plans can generate large cash 
contribution requirements arising from federal pension funding regulation in the US. Plans are 
often heavily invested in equity markets; market movements make required contributions volatile 
and unpredictable. Macroeconomic and demographic trends add further uncertainty to 
contributions – falling interest rates and rising longevity expectations increase estimates of pension 
obligations, requiring greater contributions to maintain minimum funding levels. Large and 
unpredictable contribution requirements, in turn, act as a constraint on sponsors’ investment 
activities (Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz, 2012; Cooper and Ross, 2001; Rauh, 2006).  
Unsurprisingly, a conversation on “derisking” can increasingly be heard in the corporate 
DB pension arena around the world. 3 Sponsors are employing a range of strategies to reduce or 
remove the many risks associated with DB plans (e.g., interest rate risk, longevity risk, market 
 
1 PBGC Annual Report 2018, available at: https://www.pbgc.gov/sites/default/files/pbgc-annual-report-2018.pdf. In 
2017, US Compustat firms sponsoring DB plans represented 55% of the aggregate market capitalization of all US 
public firms and reported $2.7 trillion ($2.3 trillion) in DB pension obligations (assets).   
2 E.g., on when employees will retire, what their final salary will be at retirement, what form of benefit they will 
elect, and how long they will live post-retirement – to name a few.  






risks). Some sponsors are shifting pension asset portfolios away from equity and toward fixed-
income investments, to better match pension assets with bond-like pension liabilities (an approach 
varyingly described as asset-liability matching – “ALM”, or as “liability-driven investing” –  
“LDI”). Other sponsors are resorting to selling their DB obligations to insurance companies in 
“pension risk transfer” (“PRT”) transactions, of which a record number occurred in 2019.4  
Discussions in the media and by pensions commentators point to certain regulatory triggers 
for increased derisking activity. One regulatory force often described as a “tailwind” for pension 
derisking is the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (the “TCJA”), one of the most dramatic changes to 
the US tax landscape in decades.5 A survey of US CFOs indicated an increased “appetite for 
pension derisking” (CFO Research 2018); a substantial majority of CFO respondents were mulling 
pension risk transfers under the new tax regime. The goal of our study more broadly is to 
understand the impact of the TCJA on pension risk, and more specifically, to examine whether the 
TCJA served as a driver of pension derisking.  
Tax incentives are known to be an important driver of DB pension policy, as contributions to 
DB plans can be deducted from the sponsor’s taxable income within certain limits, and all earnings 
within the pension fund are tax-exempt. The TCJA decreased the tax burden on US corporations 
by eliminating the four-step graduated tax rate structure (with a highest rate of 35%), replacing it 
 
4 GM and Verizon were early movers in a recent wave of pension risk transfers. The common approach to risk transfer 
in the US has been through a “settlement” or “buyout”, where an insurance company assumes the pension liability in 
exchange for transfer of a mutually agreed-upon sum of pension assets. The sponsor is left with no further risks or 
rewards from either pension liability or assets. GM’s and Verizon’s settlements were the largest and second-largest 
settlements in US history, transferring $25bn and $7.5bn respectively in pension liabilities. Many large sponsors have 
since followed suit. E.g.,  see Kozlowski 2018 (Available at: 
https://www.pionline.com/article/20180412/ONLINE/180419943/aon-u-s-corporate-pension-plan-buyout-volume-
to-hold-steady-at-about-25-billion-in-2018), Kharif and Buhayar 2012 (Available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-17/verizon-to-move-7-5-bln-pension-obligation-to-prudential); 
and Kozlowski 2020 (Available at: https://www.pionline.com/pension-risk-transfer/corporate-pension-plan-buyouts-
top-11-billion-q4-limra)  





with a flat rate of 21%; this reduction incentivizes firms to accelerate any tax deductions so as to 
maximize deductions obtained at the higher (“old”) rate. One such deduction is the cash 
contribution towards DB plans. Consistently, starting from late 2017, the news media was replete 
with reports of large US sponsors making sizeable discretionary contributions to their DB plans, 
with many specifically citing the tax law changes as motivation. 6 Gaertner, Lynch, and Vernon 
(2020, hereafter “GLV”) document DB contributions in response to the TCJA to the tune of $6.3-
$7.9 billion using early data, noting that the full response could be much larger.  
A surge in contributions, holding all else constant, improves pension funding – with 
attendant consequences for pension derisking. One crucial requirement for any derisking strategy, 
be it a shift in asset allocation to better match pension assets with liabilities, or a removal of the 
pension obligation from the balance sheet altogether, is to have a well-funded plan. It is believed 
that many sponsors remain invested in equity securities (despite the advantages of asset-liability 
matching) because they are reliant on the higher expected returns from equities to “earn their way” 
out of underfunding. Therefore, asset-liability matching is a feasible solution only for well- or 
fully-funded plans—industry experts suggest that sponsors have the flexibility to move towards 
such an investment strategy only when funded status reaches at least 80%.7 Similarly, settling 
pension obligations with an insurer also requires transferring assets at least equal to (or typically 
 
6 Some prominent examples: General Electric announced a discretionary contribution of $4.5 billion to its US plans 
in its 2017 annual report; Lockheed Martin announced that it was contributing $5 billion to its US plans, adding that 
it did not expect to make further contributions until 2026 
(https://www.pionline.com/article/20180130/ONLINE/180139975/lockheed-martin-to-contribute-5-billion-to-
pension-funds-in-2018); FedEx borrowed $1.5 billion for pension contributions in 2018 
(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-29/fedex-to-sell-bonds-for-pension-contribution-after-tax-
overhaul). Also see Goldman Sachs (2018): 
https://www.gsam.com/content/dam/gsam/pdfs/institutions/en/articles/pension-
solutions/2018/pension_domino_effect.pdf?sa=n&rd=n 
7 For example, see MassMutual Post-Conference Brief (November 2019). “Pathways to LDI: Ways to reach the 





greater than) the obligation transferred, requiring near-full funding almost as a precondition.8 To 
the extent to which the TCJA spurred a surge in contributions, the resulting improvement in 
funding status could have catalyzed derisking activities. 
To our goal of understanding whether the TCJA drove pension derisking, we examine 
sponsors’ anticipatory behavior before the TCJA goes into effect, as well as actual derisking 
strategies employed after. In our first set of tests, we examine contributions to DB plans during the 
“window of opportunity” between the TCJA’s announcement and its onset, during which 
deductions can still be taken at the old tax rate. After estimating TCJA-triggered pension 
contributions, we examine whether the firms most motivated to derisk their pensions tend to 
contribute more during this window of opportunity. That is, to the extent to which there is a funding 
surge in the window, we examine whether derisking concerns drive that surge. In our second set 
of tests, we examine whether the funding surge triggered subsequent derisking activity. We 
examine two derisking strategies: first, reducing pension risk while retaining the obligations, by 
shifting asset allocation away from equities and towards fixed-income investments; and second, 
engaging in risk transfer transactions that remove pension obligations – with all related risks and 
responsibilities—off the corporate balance sheet altogether.9  
 
8 Prudential White Paper (2019). “Preparing for Pension Risk Transfer”. Available at: 
http://pensionrisk.prudential.com/insights/prt-prep1-preparing-for-prt.php 
9 We find many instances of sponsors citing the TCJA as a trigger for pension derisking. A prominent example is 
Lockheed Martin, which completed two major risk transfer transactions in 2019 for almost $2.5 billion in pension 
obligations. Kozlowski (2019) reports in an interview with John Mollard (VP and Treasurer, Lockheed) that “the 
process began with the company’s $ 5 billion contribution to its pension plan in 2018...Motivated by the passage of 
the TCJA,…the company decided to accelerate its contributions to take advantage of the higher tax deduction that 
was set to expire on Sept 15, 2018…The discretionary contribution allowed the company to have enough assets 
available compared to its $43 billion US DB plan liabilities to make the cost of the transactions palatable.” Mollard 
is further quoted: “Now we can make transactions without having any sort of impact on our income or operating 
cash flows…If we’re ever going to start putting our toe in the water and start going out on the pension risk transfer 
market, now would be a good time to start.” Other sponsors disclose a shift in asset allocation strategies around the 
events we study, e.g, Weyerhaeuser, which made a voluntary contribution of $300 million to US pension plans in 
2018, details on its 2018 10-K: “At the end of 2018, we began implementing a change in our asset strategy to an 





For our first set of tests exploring whether derisking concerns drive contributions in the 
pre-TCJA window of opportunity, we focus on voluntary contributions – those in excess of 
contributions mandated by federal pension regulation, and made at the sponsor’s discretion. We 
obtain this information from Form 5500 datasets, which compile plan-level filings made jointly to 
the Department of Labor (DOL), PBGC and Internal Revenue Service (IRS).10 We manually match 
Form 5500 data (plan-level) to Compustat (firm-level) to obtain sponsoring firm fundamentals, 
yielding a sample of 3,885 US firm-year observations from 2013-2018. To estimate the increase 
in contributions triggered by the TCJA, we formally define the window of opportunity as the period 
after passage of the TCJA (the day it was signed into law) but before its onset (effective date). To 
be included in this window, therefore, firm-years must meet two criteria: first, there must be 
sufficient time (at least a day) after the TCJA’s passage for the sponsor to make voluntary 
contributions in response; and second, we must not include any contributions that will only be 
deducted at the lower (“new”) rate. Applying these criteria, as explained in Figure 1, yields a 
window of fiscal years ending March 31st, 2017 to November 30th, 2018, which we denote the 
“TCJA period”.  
We begin by comparing voluntary contributions in the TCJA period with those made in an 
approximately four-year period prior. We first reaffirm GLV’s findings of a significant increase 
in contributions in the TCJA period for federal-taxpaying firms. We then refine these inferences 
in two ways: first, the increase occurs only in voluntary (and not for mandatory) contributions, 
highlighting the importance of focusing on voluntary contributions. Second, the contribution surge 
 
our assets into fixed income securities”. Shumsky (2018) in the Wall Street Journal provides more anecdotes: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-with-newly-flush-pensions-see-chance-to-unload-the-risk-1539595800 
10 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA, 1974) first created a framework of funding regulations 
for DB plans, to ensure benefit security for participants. Amongst other things, ERISA mandated minimum funding 
levels that plans had to maintain, with resulting mandatory contributions for sponsors whose plans fell short. These 




is much larger than that documented by GLV. For the subset (about 48% of our sample) that 
approximates GLV’s selection criteria, we estimate that TCJA triggered contributions of $13.3 - 
$15.2 billion, compared to $6.3-$7.9 billion per GLV. For our whole sample, a model comparable 
to GLV’s estimates TCJA-triggered contributions at $37.9 billion; adding year fixed-effects brings 
it down to a potentially cleaner but more conservative estimate of $13.7 billion.11 
 In our first set of tests examining whether derisking concerns drive the contribution 
response, we expect the contribution response to be higher from sponsors with relatively poorly-
funded plans, and uncertain benefit payouts in the future. These sponsors can reap the most benefits 
from achieving (near-) full-funding and proceeding to derisk their obligations now. We find 
evidence consistent with both predictions, suggesting that the desire to reduce long-term funding 
risk is a key force shaping the TCJA response. Furthermore, sponsors facing higher PBGC 
premium costs (which can be eliminated via PRTs) also contribute more. Moving from plan-level 
to sponsor-level characteristics, we expect that sponsors with higher investment opportunities are 
more likely to take advantage of the window of opportunity before it closes; DB plans with their 
unpredictable cash requirements could pose a greater burden for these firms. Despite high-
investment opportunity firms having more competing demands on their resources, we find that 
they increase voluntary contributions significantly more than firms with lower investment 
opportunities. We interpret this as high-investment opportunity sponsors attempting to 
immunize/remove pension risks, so that they can proceed with their investment agenda 
unhampered by pension funding requirements. We find similarly for dividend-paying firms.  
 
11 Full details of these comparisons are in Tables OA1-OA2 of the Online Appendix. Table OA1 estimates a model 
similar to GLV’s, while table OA2 provides details of calculations used to estimate TCJA-triggered contributions 




In our second set of tests, we investigate whether the TCJA drove subsequent pension 
derisking, through the improved funding that it facilitated. Identifying the sponsors whose pension 
funding has improved more post-TCJA, we find that these firms also tend to shift their pension 
asset portfolios away from equity and towards fixed-income securities. We also confirm that shifts 
in asset allocation occur sharply around the events we study, as opposed to incrementally over 
time, suggesting that the TCJA acted as an inflexion point for pension asset risk decisions. While 
this indicates attempts at risk management, we further explore whether the TCJA spurred pension 
risk transfer (“PRT”) transactions, which represent even more drastic attempts to remove pension 
liabilities (with corresponding assets) off the corporate balance sheet altogether—a recent trend 
that is as yet not well understood.  In exploratory univariate analysis, we find that the more TCJA-
responsive sponsors also complete more and larger PRT transactions, through settlements with 
insurance companies (transferring risks to the insurer), or lump-sum payouts to plan beneficiaries 
(transferring risks to beneficiaries).  
Our study contributes to a deeper understanding of what drives DB policy choices in the 
realm of funding, asset allocation, and risk management. The twin strategies of shifts away from 
equity investments and risk transfer transactions have the combined potential to transform the DB 
landscape in the US, with consequences for the sizeable population dependent on these plans for 
retirement income. Our evidence is consistent with the TCJA acting as one driver of these trends: 
ex ante, derisking concerns appear to have driven the rush to accelerate contributions before the 
new, lower tax rate becomes applicable; and the funding improvement that resulted ex post appears 
to have spurred increased derisking activity.  
At a conceptual level, our findings of improved funding leading to lower risk in pension 




comprehensive sample of US plans, Rauh (2009) documents that as funding improves, plans tend 
to invest more in riskier asset classes. Our finding essentially the opposite relation, concentrated 
around the TCJA’s onset, suggests the possibility that in this particular context, firms went down 
the path of making contributions specifically in order to achieve their derisking goals. This path is 
made especially attractive by the TCJA’s twin effects of accelerating funding and reducing the 
long-term attractiveness of maintaining a DB plan (by lowering the value of the tax shield it 
provides), and hinted at empirically by our findings on PRT transactions. As lower-risk, better-
matched pension portfolios are often seen as an important intermediate step towards PRT 
transactions, we speculate that these twin effects of the TCJA could have delivered the equivalent 
of a “one-two punch” toward removing DB pension obligations from corporate balance sheets.  
We also contribute to the rapidly emerging literature on the consequences of the TCJA 
(e.g., Amberger and Robinson 2020; Bennett, Thakor, and Wang 2019; De Simone, McClure, and 
Stomberg 2020; Edwards and Hutchens 2020; Frank, Hoopes, and Lester 2020; Hanlon, Hoopes, 
and Slemrod 2019). As expected with a regulation as transformative as the TCJA, much work and 
discussion is needed to draw the big picture of its consequences, and to identify “winners” and 
“losers”. Some robust findings so far include substantial increases in stock buybacks, but no 
seeming increase in firms’ employee counts and wages (Bennett et al. 2019; Cohen and 
Viswanathan 2019). Alongside GLV, we document consequences – presumably unintended – for 
the retirement benefits arena. We build on GLV’s findings of a funding surge to provide a broader 
picture of the TCJA’s impact on DB pension risk.  
As a tertiary contribution, we refine GLV’s estimates of the magnitude of pension 
contributions triggered by the TCJA. While GLV employ an innovative research design that allows 




inherent limitations, which they carefully acknowledge. By examining the complete window of 
opportunity in which firms can respond and considering a larger sample of firms, we obtain 
estimates of TCJA-triggered contributions that are about two to five times GLV’s estimate 
(Appendix A provides details, as well as anecdotes of prominent sponsors whose large 
contributions are captured only with the design we employ). 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Institutional Background 
The US has had one of the highest corporate tax rates for decades, according to the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereafter, “OECD”). 12 The TCJA 
was signed into law on December 22, 2017 (effective for tax years beginning on or after January 
1, 2018) with the objective of reducing the tax burden of US corporations, encouraging domestic 
investments, and increasing employment.  
The TCJA eliminated the four-step graduated corporate tax rate structure with a highest 
rate of 35%, replacing it with a flat corporate tax rate of 21%. The TCJA also introduced a ceiling 
to the amount of deductible business interest expense in a tax year.13 It has been called the largest 
tax overhaul since the Reagan Tax Reforms in 1981 and 1986; the US now joins the lowest taxed 
group among OECD members.  
The reduction in corporate tax rate also decreases tax savings on pension contributions. 
According to 26 U.S. Code §404(a), §6072(a), and §6081(b), contributions to qualified DB plans 
are generally deductible from taxable income. In addition, a grace period of up to ten and half 
 
12 The OECD Tax database: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=78166# 
13 The upper limit for interest expense is equal to the sum of (1) business interest income for the taxable year; (2) 
30% of the adjusted taxable income of the taxpayer for the taxable year; and (3) the floor plan financing interest 
expense for the taxable year. Any amount of interest expense exceeding the above limit is not allowed to be 




months is granted to allow firms to make contributions after the taxable year-end, but deduct from 
taxable income earned during that tax year. So a firm with fiscal year ending on December 31, 
2017, for example, still has a window of opportunity: any contributions made before September 
15, 2018, can be deducted at the higher (“old”) rate. This grace period was crucial to enabling 
December-year end firms to obtain tax deductions on accelerated pension contributions at the old 
rate, and hence forms a key part of our research design.  
Drivers of increased contributions in the window of opportunity: Do derisking concerns matter? 
Anecdotes, practitioner surveys (e.g., Goldman Sachs 2018), and academic evidence (GLV) 
indicates a surge in pension contributions in the pre-TCJA window of opportunity, presumably 
from sponsors accelerating future contributions so as to claim deductions at the pre-TCJA tax rate 
of 35%. We do not, however, expect this contribution response to be uniform in the cross-section; 
sponsors that derive greater benefits from accelerating contributions will be more likely to do so.  
We posit that the ultimate objective of derisking pension plans drove accelerated 
contributions from many sponsors. Accordingly, we identify plan- and sponsor-specific factors 
that create a greater economic burden from pension contributions; we expect these firms to have 
correspondingly greater motivation to accelerate contributions so as to derisk their pensions.  
First, we expect sponsors with relatively poorly-funded plans to accelerate contributions 
more, for multiple reasons. From a taxation perspective, pension contributions are deductible only 
up to a limit, based on funding level—sponsors cannot continue to claim tax deductions for 
contributions made to fully- (or over-) funded plans. 14 Furthermore, assets once contributed are 
costly to withdraw, and overfunded plans can trigger union demands for benefit increases. 
 
14 According to 26 U.S. Code § 404 (o), in general, contributions are deductible if the amount of such contributions 
do not exceed the excess of the sum of funding target, target normal cost and the “cushion amount”, over the 
actuarial value of plan assets. The cushion amount is the sum of 50% of the funding target and any amount by which 




Importantly, from a pension risk perspective, poorly-funded plans generate larger mandatory 
contributions from federal pension laws; these plans can hence pose a substantial drain on 
operating cash flows (Rauh, 2006). The burden from underfunded plans is even greater once other 
carrying costs are considered: all tax-qualified plans (i.e., to which contributions are tax deductible) 
are required to pay yearly insurance premiums to the PBGC, which are partly based on their 
funding deficit. These insurance premia have been rising considerably in recent years, more than 
doubling since 2009.15 Our first hypothesis follows:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Firms with lower pension funding status increase voluntary contributions to 
DB plans in the TCJA period more than firms with higher pension funding status. 
DB plans can also be unpredictable in their cash demands, as funding ratios change year-
on-year due to market performance, changing interest rates, and shifts in other actuarial 
assumptions. CFOs often describe DB plans as a “volatile debt” that they are forced to carry on 
their balance sheets (Wall Street Journal, 2018), which “consistently defies planning and budgeting 
exercises”(Buck Consultants, 2020), Some plans are more subject to this uncertainty than others – 
in plans with more active employees, the eventual benefit is still subject to unpredictable 
fluctuations in future salary increases, retirement ages, disability rates, form of benefit elected, etc., 
whereas with inactive beneficiaries (i.e., retired or terminated employees) the benefit has already 
been “defined” to a large extent. Plans with more active participants also have a longer duration, 
making the obligation more sensitive to any fluctuation in interest rates. While such plans may not 
 
15 The PBGC insurance premium consists of: (i) a variable-rate premium determined by plan funded status and (ii) a 
flat-rate premium based on the number of participants. Variable-rate premiums have been rising from 3.4% on any 
unfunded benefits in 2017 to 3.8% (2018), 4.3% (2019), and 4.5% (2020). Variable-rate premiums are capped at 
$517 times the number of participants in 2017, but the cap rate rises to $541 in 2019. Meanwhile, flat-rate premiums 
are up from $69 per participant in 2017 to $74 (2018), $80 (2019), and $83 (2020). For more information, see: 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 2019 Premium Rates, Source: Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp. (PBGC), 






need cash immediately to fund benefit payouts, by accelerating contributions to reach near-funding 
they could also derive greater benefits of reducing the volatility from uncertain future funding 
requirements. Our second prediction follows:  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Firms with relatively more active participants increase voluntary 
contributions to DB plans in the TCJA period more than firms with lesser active participants.  
We consider a third plan-level characteristic: how many participants are supported by each 
firm’s plans. The insurance premia that sponsors pay to the PBGC consists of two parts, one based 
on the funding deficit (“variable-rate” premium) and one based on the number of participants 
(“fixed-rate” premium). Plans with more participants, therefore, incur a larger cost to simply 
maintain their plans, relative to the benefits actually paid out. These plans could have particular 
incentives to improve funding so as to then settle the plan liability in a PRT transaction – which 
then removes PBGC protection and in turn, premiums (CFO Research, 2018; Prudential, 2019). 
Our third prediction follows:  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Firms with higher flat-rate premiums increase voluntary contributions to DB 
plans in the TCJA period more than firms with lower flat-rate premiums.   
Moving to sponsor-level characteristics, even amongst DB pension sponsors, large and 
fluctuating cash contribution requirements can be costlier for some sponsors than for others. We 
expect sponsors with more competing demands on their cash flows to be more strongly motivated 
to derisk pensions when the opportunity presents itself. Accordingly, we examine competing 
demands along two dimensions: investment opportunities and dividend policy.  
A robust literature examines how (mandatory) pension contributions affect investment in 
operating projects (e.g. Rauh, 2006; Campbell et al., 2012; Bakke and Whited, 2012; Dambra, 
2018), and concludes that mandatory pension contributions do displace investments, particularly 
for firms with underfunded plans. As a result, firms with stronger investment opportunities could 




decisions are constrained by pension funding requirements, exploiting the TCJA’s window of 
opportunity allows such a constrained firm to maximize current tax savings, while also progress 
with derisking (either through asset allocation shifts or pension risk transfer). This then allows the 
firm to proceed with its investment agenda relatively unhampered by pension funding 
requirements for the near- to medium-term.16 To that extent, we would expect firms with greater 
investment opportunities to be more motivated to derisk; our prediction follows:17  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Firms with greater investment opportunities increase voluntary contributions 
to DB plans in the TCJA period more than firms with lesser investment opportunities.  
We also expect firms with a tradition of paying dividends to be similarly motivated to 
derisk pensions, so as to preserve the cash flows needed to maintain dividend payouts (Amir, Guan, 
and Oswald 2010; Anantharaman and Chuk 2018). Volatility in the cash flows required to be 
diverted to pensions can be especially costly to these firms. Accordingly:  
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Dividend-paying firms increase voluntary contributions to DB plans in the 
TCJA period more than other firms.  
We note that the ability to pay could act as a countervailing force to our predictions. For 
example, firms with many investment opportunities must choose whether to allocate current 
resources to pension contributions or to core investments. As a result, firms with lesser investment 
opportunities (or dividend commitments) might be able to make more contributions, as they have 
fewer competing demands on the table. This could work against our predictions, empirically.  
Consequences of Increased Contributions: Do firms derisk pension plans after TCJA onset?  
 
16 Consistently, industry experts anticipate lower contributions in 2019 due to improved funding ratios from TCJA. 
“Contributions to corporate plans likely to be down with '17 tax law”. Pensions & Investments (March 18, 2019). 
Available at: https://www.pionline.com/article/20190318/PRINT/190319876/contributions-to-corporate-plans-
likely-to-be-down-with-17-tax-law 
17 These firms must choose whether to allocate current resources to pension contributions or to core business 
investments. As a result, firms with lesser investment opportunities might be able to make more contributions, as 





Sponsors wishing to manage pension risks have a range of options; for one, they can shift 
plan assets away from equity towards fixed-income securities, which more naturally hedge the 
bond-like nature of pension obligations. In recent times, some US sponsors have resorted to more 
drastic, pension “risk transfer” transactions, in which the sponsor removes the liability from its 
books entirely, either by transferring it to an insurance company (a “settlement" or “buyout”), or 
by offering lump-sum payouts to beneficiaries in lieu of lifetime benefits.   
A natural constraint to these derisking strategies comes from underfunding. Shifting plan 
assets towards bonds that are duration-matched to the benefit cash flows can immunize the plan 
from interest rate risk and reduce the volatility of required cash contributions; however, it also 
sacrifices the higher expected returns from equity investments and could necessitate more 
contributions from the sponsor, on average. Therefore, plans typically consider asset-liability 
matching only as they become well-funded or approach full funding, after which point the plan 
can be put into effective “hibernation” with asset-liability matching.18 Similarly, settling pension 
obligations with an insurer also requires transferring pension assets at least equal to the book value 
of the obligation settled, and typically greater than the book value, as most US settlements have 
occurred at a premium so far. Therefore, settlements require near-full funding almost as a 
precondition.19 If the TCJA indeed spurs large contributions from DB sponsors and shores up 
funding levels, these derisking strategies could become more feasible as a result. Our final set of 
predictions follows:  
 
18 For example, see MassMutual Life Insurance Company (September 2019): “Key Decisions for De-Risking your 
Pension Plan”. Available at: 
https://www.massmutual.com/static/path/media/institutional/is8005_082819ui_prt%20whitepaper%20v5_final.pdf. 
Another force acts in favor of shifting away from equities as plans approach full funding: reversion taxes make it 
costly to retrieve excess assets from an overfunded plan. So as plans approach 100% funding, the risk-reward 
tradeoff associated with equities becomes naturally less attractive.  
19 Prudential White Paper (2019). “Preparing for Pension Risk Transfer”. Available at: 
http://pensionrisk.prudential.com/insights/prt-prep1-preparing-for-prt.php. Also see the Mercer Pension Buyout 




Hypothesis 6 (H6): Sponsors with larger TCJA-triggered funding increases tend to decrease plan 
investments in risky securities more after the TCJA takes effect. 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Sponsors with larger TCJA-triggered funding increases tend to increase plan 
investments in safe securities more after the TCJA takes effect. 
 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): Sponsors with larger TCJA-triggered funding increases engage in more 
pension risk transfer transactions after the TCJA’s passage.  
 Prior research, however, suggests some countervailing effects. The theory of risk-shifting, 
as applied to DB pensions, predicts that poorly-funded plans (for whom the “PBGC put” option is 
more valuable) will invest more in riskier asset classes such as equities (Sharpe, 1976). The 
empirical evidence on this point, however, had been quite mixed. Rauh (2009), in a comprehensive 
examination of 10-K and Form 5500 data, documents that plan portfolios shift towards equities as 
plans become better-funded. 20  Extrapolating Rauh (2009)’s findings into our setting, with 
improved funding ratios following the TCJA we would predict more risky investments, not less.  
 Other studies suggest that the relation between funding status and asset allocation is more 
nuanced. Bader (1991) argues that while moderately-funded plans might prefer to invest in equities, 
very well-funded plans might move away from equities and invest in safer instruments instead, so 
as to minimize volatility in required contributions. Accordingly, Amir and Benartzi (1999) predict 
and finds an inverted U-shaped relation between funding status and allocation to equities: equity 
allocations increase as plans become moderately well-funded, but decline as plans become very 
well-funded. As the risk-returns tradeoffs associated with equities become naturally less attractive 
as plans approach full funding, and as hibernation or PRT becomes more feasible, we could expect 
to see a shift away from equities at higher funding levels. Therefore, how pension asset risk 
 
20 Finding that plan portfolios move towards bonds as plans become more poorly-funded is consistent with risk 




changes post-TCJA – whether we will see a shift towards equities or away from them – ultimately 
begs empirical examination.    
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Determinants of Contributions in the TCJA window of opportunity 
We examine the contribution response to the TCJA with the following regression model:   
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_5500𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑃𝐵𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡   
(1) 
To examine whether derisking concerns drive the contribution response, we augment 
Model (1) with interactions flagging the firms with stronger incentives to derisk:  
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3 ∗ 𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_5500𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑃𝐵𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8
∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡   
(1a) 
The dependent variable is voluntary contributions for the plan year, scaled by lagged total 
assets, multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. We rely on Form 5500s for data on voluntary 
contributions. We use Form 5500s rather than the Compustat Pension dataset, which compiles 
sponsoring firm-level pension disclosures from SEC filings, for two reasons. First, the Form 5500 
breaks total contributions into mandatory and voluntary for each reported plan year, whereas this 
disclosure is not required in SEC filings. Our interest is specifically in the voluntary contribution, 
which captures discretionary funding choices. Second, Form 5500s, which were also designed to 
satisfy reporting requirements under the Internal Revenue Code, allow us to cleanly isolate 
contributions that are tax-deductible—the salient construct in our study. As our analysis is at the 




TCJA is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-year observations with a year-end 
falling in the “TCJA period”, and zero otherwise. At an intuitive level, the “TCJA period” 
represents our attempt to define the window of opportunity that sponsors had to maximize tax 
deductions: the period starting from the TCJA’s signing into law, and ending when its lower tax 
rate becomes effective. To be included in the window, therefore, firm-years must meet two criteria: 
first, there must be at least a day after the TCJA’s passage for the sponsor to make contributions 
in response; and second, any contributions that will only be deducted at the lower (“new”) rate 
must not be included. Complicating the definition of this window is a feature unique to this 
setting—sponsors can make contributions (and file Form 5500s) up to ten and half months after 
the tax year ends, but still deduct those contributions at the tax rate applicable to that tax year.21  
As the TCJA was signed into law on December 22nd, 2017, sponsors with fiscal year ending 
on March 31st, 2017 can make contributions (deductible from income earned during the tax year 
ending on March 31st, 2017) up until January 15th, 2018, allowing them the time (albeit only about 
three weeks) to make contributions in response to the TCJA’s passage—our first criterion. Hence, 
our window begins with fiscal year-end dates of March 31st, 2017.22 As the TCJA is effective for 
fiscal years beginning on and after January 1st, 2018 (i.e., ending on December 31st, 2018), our 
window ends right before, at the fiscal year-end of November 30th, 2018, to meet our second 
criterion, as all contributions made by these firms still qualify for deduction at the old rate. Fiscal 
years ending December 31, 2018 and onwards, though, are not included in the window, as the 
TCJA’s reduced tax rate becomes applicable. Therefore, fiscal years ending March 31st, 2017 to 
 
21 Generally, this grace period is nine and half months after the year-end. However, the grace period is eight and half 
months for firms with a taxable year ending on December 31, and ten and half months for firms with a taxable year 
ending on June 30 (see 26 U.S. Code § 404(a)(6), § 6072(a), and § 6081(b)). 
22 According to 26 U.S. Code § 441 (b), generally, tax year of a public-traded U.S. firm is the same as its annual 




November 30th, 2018 comprise our window of opportunity, which we denote the “TCJA period” 
(Figure 1 illustrates). By completely spanning the period in which firms can respond to the TCJA 
with voluntary contributions that still qualify for deduction at the old tax rate, we ensure a 
comprehensive estimate of TCJA-triggered contributions. 
We identify firms’ response to TCJA by comparing voluntary contributions made in the 
TCJA period with voluntary contributions made in a “control” period before its passage, which we 
denote the “pre-TCJA period”. A positive and significant coefficient on TCJA (𝛽1) in Model (1) 
would indicate that voluntary pension funding increased in the TCJA period, presumably to 
maximize tax benefits before its effective date. Positive and significant coefficients on the 
TCJA*High ( 𝛽3)  interactions in Model (1a) would indicate a stronger TCJA-triggered 
contribution response from firms we identify as being particularly driven to derisk.  
We control for key pension- and firm-level fundamentals that could drive contribution 
behavior. We control for pension funded status (FundRatio_5500), defined as total US pension 
assets before current year pension contributions divided by total US pension liabilities; we expect 
well-funded firms to contribute less. We also control for obligations attributed to active 
participants (ActivePBO). Both of these controls are obtained by aggregating Form 5500 data to 
the firm-level. Moving to sponsoring firm fundamentals, we control for firm size (Size), beginning 
leverage (Lev), return on assets (ROA), asset tangibility (PPE), and year-on-year sales growth 
(SalesGrowth). Appendix B presents detailed variable definitions.  
We include firm fixed effects, to control for time invariant firm characteristics, and year 




effects as important in helping us to separate the effects of the TCJA from other ongoing trends or 
events specific to 2017 and 2018.23 We cluster standard errors at firm level.  
Consequences of Contributions – Pension Asset Allocations 
To examine whether firms more impacted by the TCJA tend to shift plan asset allocations 
towards safer investments, we estimate the following model:  
Δ%𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑌𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 Δ%𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡  
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1 ∗ ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 _ 𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 ∗ %𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2(𝑜𝑟, %𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10
∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽15 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  
(2) 
Our analysis continues to be at the sponsoring firm-level, and for Eq. (2) all variables are 
obtained from SEC filings via Compustat. The dependent variable is alternatively the percentage 
of plan assets invested in risky securities (%RISKY), or in safe securities (%SAFE).  
If the TCJA indeed generated a surge in DB contributions, a direct consequence is 
improvement in funding status. Therefore, we gauge responsiveness to the TCJA by the 
improvement in funding status between the period preceding TCJA signing, and the period after 
TCJA goes into effect (∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴 ). Consider a sponsor with fiscal year ending on 
December 31st, for example; we calculate funding ratio on December 31st, 2018 (right after the 
“TCJA period” window ends) minus funding ratio on December 31st, 2016 (the last fiscal year 
before TCJA passage). Hypothesis 6 (Hypothesis 7) predicts  𝛽1  to be significantly negative 
(positive) with %RISKY (%SAFE) as the dependent variable.  
 
23 The year fixed effects become estimable in a model containing TCJA only because our compilation of the window 
of opportunity (fiscal years ending March 31, 2017 to November 30, 2018) yields multiple observations with, 




As ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴 is set up specifically to measure changes over the TCJA period, we 
estimate this model only on one cross-section of data, i.e., the post-TCJA period, which comprises 
fiscal years ending from December 31st, 2018 to November 30th, 2019 (please see Figure 1). Our 
objective with this test, therefore, is to examine whether asset allocations shift post-TCJA as a 
function of how strongly funding surged in the TCJA window of opportunity. To the extent to 
which the TCJA-triggered funding surge made derisking feasible, we would expect firms with a 
stronger funding improvement to unwind equity allocations; however, it remains an open question 
whether funding improves sufficiently to bring that about.  
We control for known determinants of asset allocation from Amir et al. (2010; 
Anantharaman and Chuk (2018), Anantharaman and Lee (2014), Rauh (2009). We incorporate the 
level of funding status (FundRatio) and its square (𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜2) to account for any nonlinear 
relations between asset allocation and funding status, shown in prior work. We also control for 
plan horizon (Horizon), estimated by inverting the relation between the PBO and ABO, as plans 
with younger participants have longer investment horizon and may find it optimal to invest in 
equity securities.24 We include contemporaneous and past actual rates of return on pension assets 
(𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) to control for passive movements in equity allocations arising from failure to 
rebalance period-by-period (Rauh 2009), supplemented by the broad-based performance of global 
equity markets with returns to the S&P Global Broad Market Index for equities (MarketReturn). 
We also control for the level of allocation to risky or safe assets at the beginning of the TCJA 
 
24 Horizon is a more indirect estimate of the plan’s age profile compared to ActivePBO, which we use in Eq (1) and 
which directly captures the proportion of the obligation owed to active participants. In Eq. (1), we use Form 5500 
data, allowing the use of ActivePBO. In contrast, Eq. (2) is based entirely on sponsoring firm-level data extracted 
from 10-Ks via Compustat, since asset allocation data on Form 5500s are too crude and noisy to be usable. Firm-





window (%𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 or %𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑖,𝑡−2), as firms with a higher equity allocation will have more 
scope and greater need to derisk.  
Moving from pension characteristics to firm characteristics, we include the taxpaying 
status of the sponsor (TaxBill), defined as federal tax expense before pension contribution 
deductions, as Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) predict that taxpaying sponsors invest more in 
bonds (Amir, Guan, and Oswald 2010; Anantharaman and Chuk 2018; Rauh 2009). Larger 
sponsors could have more diversified investment portfolios (Size). Some firms could have 
particular incentives to minimize the volatility of plan funding status (and hence of contribution 
requirements) – highly leveraged firms (Lev), firms with a tradition of paying dividends (Dividend), 
and firms with inherently volatile operating cash flows (SDCF, the standard deviation of operating 
cash flows). The actuarial assumptions affecting pension liability measurement (the discount rate 
-- 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡, and the rate of compensation increase -- 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡) help to control for changes 
in funding status that are unrelated to sponsor contributions in the TCJA window.  
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Sample Selection and Data Description 
We obtain qualified pension plan data for Eq. (1)-(1a) from the Form 5500 dataset, 
compiled by the US Department of Labor (“DOL”) from US plan filings. We obtain from Form 
5500s the mandatory contributions (i.e., calculated by predetermined formulae so as to maintain 
minimum funding levels set by federal pension regulation) and voluntary contributions (i.e., those 
in excess of mandatory contributions, made at the discretion of the sponsor) separately. Form 
5500s are the only source for these data, as sponsors only report total contributions (without 
distinguishing mandatory and voluntary) on SEC filings. Another advantage of Form 5500 data is 




qualified plans on SEC filings. Contributions to non-qualified plans are not tax deductible, and 
contributions to international plans are presumably not (directly) influenced by the TCJA. We 
restrict our sample to qualified ERISA pension plans with at least 100 participants at the beginning 
of the 2017 plan year, and to plans not terminated before the TCJA was signed into law (i.e., 
12/22/2017). Obtaining sponsoring firm fundamentals necessitates matching the Form 5500 
dataset to Compustat. The two datasets lack a common identifier, as a result of which we employ 
a multistep process (detailed in Table 1) to obtain as complete a match as possible.  
As shown in Table 1, Panel A, our sample begins with 47,704 firm-year observations from 
the Compustat Fundamentals database, from 2013 to 2018. We restrict our sample to firms that 
are either incorporated or headquartered in the US, as firms that are neither incorporated nor 
headquartered in the US may have different tax planning strategies. Removing (1) observations 
with non-positive or missing total assets, or missing sales; (2) firms without observations in the 
TCJA period; (3) firms that cannot be matched to ERISA-qualified pension plans; (4) observations 
with missing data required for main analyses, leaves us with 3,885 firm-year observations from 
799 unique firms for tests on determinants of voluntary contributions. As Compustat Pensions has 
a “universe” of about 1200 US pension sponsors, our sample has reasonable coverage despite the 
challenges of hand-matching Form 5500s to Compustat.25  
Data for pension-related variables for asset allocation tests [Eq. (2)] are obtained from the 
Compustat Pension Annual dataset. We use solely Compustat data for these tests because asset 
allocation on Form 5500s is crude, with most sponsors classifying a large proportion of assets into 
ambiguous categories from which users cannot infer whether they are equity, fixed income, real 
 
25 Some of these US pension sponsors on Compustat could have only international pension plans (this is not 




estate, or other asset classes whose risk-return characteristics are understood. 26 Furthermore, most 
Form 5500s for plan years in the post-TCJA period are not yet available. 
Table 1, Panel B outlines sample selection for asset allocation tests. We begin with 4,669 
firm-year observations from the 799 firms included in the sample for Eq. (1)-(1a), from 2013 to 
2019. We remove (1) observations with fiscal year-end falling in the TCJA period (i.e., from 
March 31st, 2017 to November 30th, 2018); (2) observations that are missing data needed for Eq. 
(2); and (3) firms that do not have post-TCJA observations. This leaves us with 417 unique firms 
for which we can relate funding changes over the TCJA window to asset allocation shifts post-
TCJA, as laid out in Eq. (2).   
Table 2, Panel A reports descriptive statistics of variables used in our voluntary 
contribution analyses [Eq. (1)-(1a)]. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 
1%. Average voluntary contributions over 2013-2018 are $39.3 million, shifting from $34.5 
million in the pre-TCJA (control) period to $54.3 million in the TCJA period – a statistically and 
economically significant increase. Total voluntary contributions made in the TCJA period amount 
to $51.8 billion. Mandatory contributions are not only smaller on average but also hold fairly 
steady at $9.3 million (pre-TCJA) and $10.9 million (TCJA).    
The average funded status reported on Form 5500s is 112%, and about 50% of the sample 
has overfunded plans; note however that the obligation (and hence funding ratio) on the Form 5500 
is calculated differently from that calculated for financial reporting purposes on the 10-K; we 
 
26 Those categories, listed on Schedule H to the Form 5500, include the value of interest in “common/collective 
trusts”, “pooled separated accounts”, “master trust investment accounts”, “103-12 investment entities”, “registered 
investment companies (e.g., mutual funds)”, “insurance company general account (unallocated contracts)”, and 
“Other”. Generally, these descriptors reflect the legal holding structure of the investments, rather than their risk-




denote the latter as “GAAP-based funding” for expositional clarity. 27 Pension obligations owed to 
active participants, on average, represent 3% of total assets.  
Table 2, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the 417 firm sample used in asset 
allocation tests, along with comparable statistics for the pre-TCJA period, to understand longer-
term trends in asset allocation. Looking at changes in asset allocation, an inflexion point is evident 
around the TCJA: all measures of risky investments show steep drops to the tune of 8% post-TCJA, 
with fixed-income investment rising commensurately. Risky investments appear to be steadily 
declining in the periods leading up to TCJA; however, the post-TCJA decline is about three to five 
times larger in magnitude.  The average GAAP-based funding ratio is lower than Form 5500-based 
funding, and rises from 80% to 83%; this is consistent with our main explanatory variable 
∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴, which shows a mean (median) increase of 3.7% (3%); at the 25th percentile, 
funding ratio remains steady, and at the 75th percentile it increases by 7%.  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
TCJA-triggered contributions in the window of opportunity  
As a starting point for examining whether derisking incentives moderate voluntary 
contributions, we re-establish the base conclusion of GLV – that contributions surged in response 
to the TCJA – but (i) with our expanded sample, (ii) including the full window of opportunity to 
make contributions, (iii) focusing on voluntary contributions, and (iv) incorporating year fixed 
effects, enabled by the more complete definition of the TCJA window. We note here that while 
 
27 Pension funding on the Form 5500 is based on guidance in authoritative federal pension regulation–most recently 
the Pension Protection Act (2006) and the MAP-21 Act (2012), the latter of which required the 25-year average of 
investment-grade corporate bond yields for discounting. The funding status as reported on financial statements, in 
contrast, is based on guidance from Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Per GAAP, the pension 
liability for financial reporting purposes should be based on discounting at the high-quality corporate bond yield on 
the financial report date. As US bond yields have seen historic lows in recent years, the funding status reported in 
Form 5500 datasets is generally higher than GAAP-based funding in recent years. Other differences also exist 




GLV’s purpose was to document an economically significant contribution response; for our 
purposes – understanding why some firms contribute more than others, and what consequences 
follow for pension risk – it is essential to have a complete measure of the TCJA-triggered 
contribution for each firm.  
To this end, we present results of estimating Eq. (1) in Table 3, Panel A. Columns (1)–(2) 
present estimations with only firm but no year fixed effects (consistent with GLV), while Columns 
(3)–(4) present estimations with firm and year fixed effects. While the coefficient on TCJA is 
positive and significant at the < 0.01 level in column (1), indicating an overall increase in 
contributions consistent with GLV, including year fixed effects in Column (3) renders this 
coefficient insignificant.  
GLV document that the increase in contributions occurs predominantly within taxpaying 
firms; accordingly, we augment Eq. (1) with an indicator for taxpaying firms and its interaction 
with TCJA. This yields a clearer picture: Taxpayer*TCJA is not only positive and significant at the 
< 0.01 level in Column (2), but more importantly, remains virtually unchanged in Column (4) with 
year fixed effects. In Column (4), interestingly, the base coefficient on TCJA turns negative once 
the interaction term is included. Interpreting these coefficients, the negative coefficient on TCJA 
indicates that non-taxpaying sponsors actually decrease voluntary contributions on average, from 
5.64% (𝛽0) to 5.41% (𝛽0 + 𝛽1) of total assets. Taxpaying sponsors, on the other hand, increase 
voluntary contributions from 5.80% (𝛽0 + 𝛽2) to 5.93% of total assets (𝛽0 + 𝛽1+𝛽2 + 𝛽3). In sum, 
taxpaying firms increase voluntary contributions significantly in the TCJA window, and to the 
tune of 0.355% (of total assets) more than non-taxpaying firms, controlling for other determinants 




Translating the Column (4) effects into dollar terms yields an average increase of $27.55 
million in voluntary contributions from taxpaying sponsors in the TCJA period, compared to an 
average decrease of $53.3 million for non-taxpaying sponsors. Across all sponsors in our sample, 
this amounts to an average increase in voluntary contributions of $14.34 million, or roughly 42% 
of the average pre-TCJA voluntary contribution. 28 Aggregating across all sponsors yields our 
estimate of the total TCJA-triggered contribution for our sample – $13.7 billion.  
While these estimates come from Column (4), the model in Column (2) is more comparable 
to GLV, with its use of firm but not year fixed effects. The average increase in voluntary 
contributions across all sponsors in the TCJA period, from that model, works out to a much larger 
$39.72 million, or 115% of the pre-TCJA voluntary contribution. Aggregating across all sponsors 
yields total TCJA-triggered contributions of $37.9 billion. 29 Compared to GLV’s estimate of $6.3-
$7.9 billion, our expansion of the sample and inclusion of the full TCJA window does, therefore, 
make an economically significant difference to estimates of the TCJA’s impact. However, we 
believe that the $13.7 billion estimate from Column (4) is more cleanly attributable specifically to 
the TCJA.  
In Table 3, Panel B, we present estimations of a placebo test, wherein we rerun Eq. (1) but 
with the dependent variable as mandatory contributions, which are predetermined by formulae 
established by federal pension regulation. Consistent with expectation, we observe no significant 
 
28 The average increase of $14.34 million for Column (6) is the total estimate of TCJA-triggered voluntary 
contributions divided by the total number of observations (both taxpaying and non-taxpaying) in the TCJA period 
[$13.7 billion/ (799+156) = $14.34 million]. Similar calculations for Column (3) yield $39.72 million.  
29 We obtain these estimates as follows: Using the model with firm and year fixed effects in Column (4), for 
taxpaying sponsors, (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) percent * pre-TCJA mean of $22.043 billion of total assets yields an average increase 
of $27.55 million. For non-taxpaying sponsors, (𝛽1) percent * pre-TCJA mean of $23.174 billion of total assets 
yields an average decrease of $53.3 million. For the overall sample, this corresponds to a total estimate of TCJA-
triggered voluntary contributions of $27.55 million * 799 taxpaying observations minus $53.3 million * 156 non-
taxpaying observations = $13.7 billion. Corresponding calculations for the model with only firm but no year fixed-




increase in mandatory contributions during the TCJA period, with an insignificant coefficient on 
TCJA (𝛽1) in Column (5), and on both TCJA and on Taxpayer*TCJA in Column (6). The TCJA-
triggered response, therefore, is concentrated in voluntary contributions, which we continue to use 
in cross-sectional tests examining derisking incentives. 30  
Consistent with pension funding theory and prior literature, throughout Table 3, firms with 
relatively poorly-funded plans (FundRatio_5500) make more voluntary contributions. Sponsors 
with more of their obligations owed to active participants (ActivePBO) also make more voluntary 
contributions. Other firm-level controls are mostly insignificant.  
Do derisking concerns drive voluntary contributions in the TCJA window?  
Moving to our first set of tests examining whether derisking incentives drive contributions, 
we present in Table 4 the results of estimating Eq. (1a), where we interact the TCJA indicator with 
a series of indicators flagging firms with relatively strong derisking incentives, as laid out in H1-
H5. Across Panels A-B, the High=1 (High=0) subsample represents above-median (below-median) 
values of the partitioning variable, with averages presented at the bottom of Table 4. We also 
augment Eq. (1a) with Taxpayer, which is positive and significant in Table 3 models.   
Exploring pension plan characteristics in Panel A, we hypothesize that TCJA-triggered 
contributions will be greater for relatively poorly-funded plans (Columns (1)-(2)), firms with more 
uncertain (i.e., active) obligations (Column (3)), and firms facing higher participant-based 
premiums (Columns (4)-(5)). We measure relatively poorly-funded plans not only with the plan’s 
own funding ratio (Underfund_pbo), but also with the funding deficit relative to the sponsor’s 
 
30 If the surge in contributions is indeed attributable to sponsors’ responding, of their own volition, to tax incentives 
created by TCJA, then we would expect this surge primarily in voluntary—rather than mandatory, contributions. If 
we had observed to the contrary that mandatory contributions also increase, that would indicate other macro shifts 
that we would need to investigate further. For example, contemporaneous changes in pension regulations can move 
contributions; macroeconomic factors such as stock market performance, inflation expectations, etc. can impact 
actuarial assumptions, which can in turn increase/decrease funding status reported on Form 5500s and affect 




assets (Underfund_assets); sponsors with higher Underfund_assets have pension deficits that are 
a more economically-significant part of their corporate balance sheet. We measure the uncertainty 
of benefit payouts with the proportion of the obligation owed to active participants (ActivePBO); 
we measure premiums with the raw number of participants in the firm’s plans, as well as a more 
direct estimate of participant-based premiums relative to sales revenues.  
Coefficients on the TCJA*High interaction terms are uniformly positive and significant, 
largely consistent with our expectations. In terms of magnitude, sponsors with lower funding ratios 
and more economically-significant funding deficits increase voluntary contributions to the tune of 
$35.4 million on average, and sponsors with more active obligations increase them to the tune of 
$32.8 million. With premiums in Columns (4)-(5), the TCJA*High interaction term is only 
marginally significant when based on number of participants, but highly significant when based 
on the estimate of premium cost relative to the sponsor’s revenues, with the higher-cost sponsors 
increasing contributions to the tune of $46.3 million on average.  
Poorly-funded plans will generate larger demands on cash flows in the future, and active 
plans generate more uncertain demands. Firms sponsoring both kinds of plans benefit more from 
accelerating contributions in the TCJA window, as do firms with relatively high PBGC premium 
costs, which can be saved by engaging in a PRT. Overall, these results are strongly suggestive of 
contribution responses to the TCJA being shaped by sponsors’ desire to manage long-term funding 
risk and plan expenses.  
 Moving from plan-level to sponsor-level characteristics in Panel B, we hypothesize that 
sponsors with more competing demands on cash flows will be more eager to use the one-time 
opportunity from the TCJA to improve pension funding and reduce/remove pension risks. In 




indicators based on market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s Q, respectively. In Column (3), we interact 
with an indicator based on the amount of dividend paid by sponsors (Dividend). Across all three 
columns, we observe a consistent pattern: sponsors with greater competing demands on cash flows 
contribute more in the TCJA window. High-investment opportunity firms increase voluntary 
contributions in the TCJA window to the tune of $31 million, and dividend-paying firms do so by 
$35.7 million; we observe this response despite the demands that contributions place on internal 
resources. This suggests that these firms are highly motivated to maximize tax savings in the 
present while freeing themselves up to proceed with their investment / payout agenda in the future, 
unhindered by unpredictable demands for pension contributions.   
Do the more responsive firms derisk their plans following TCJA onset?  
We now move to our second set of tests, examining how the TCJA impacts pension asset 
allocations. Table 5 presents the results of estimating Eq. (2), which examines how asset 
allocations change post-TCJA as a function of how much plan funding shifts during the TCJA 
window (∆FundRatio_TCJA); only a single cross-section of sponsor data is used in this test. 
Columns (1)-(4) vary only in the asset class groupings included in the dependent variable – in 
Column (1), the dependent variable (∆%RISKY) is the change in percentage of pension assets 
invested in equity securities; Column (2) expands ∆%RISKY to include real estate; Column (3) 
includes “other” asset classes in addition (primarily, “alternative” investments such as hedge funds 
and venture capital). In Column (4), the dependent variable (∆%SAFE) is the change in percentage 
of pension assets invested in fixed-income securities, annuities, and cash / cash equivalents.  
The results across columns paint a consistent picture of reduction in risky investments and 
a corresponding shift to safer investments. Across the broadening definitions of risky investments, 




reduction in equities and real estate, and 0.402% reduction in all risky asset classes. Allocation to 
safer investments increases commensurately by 0.405% in Column (4), confirming that what we 
observe is indeed derisking rather than reallocation across various risky asset classes. For the 
median (mean) funding ratio increase of 3% (3.7%), this translates into a reduction in all risky 
assets of 1.2% (1.5%); for the 75th percentile funding ratio increase of 7%, into a reduction of 2.8%.  
These changes are equivalent to 7%, 9%, and 17% of one SD of risky assets.    
One concern with using funding ratio changes as an explanatory variable is that the funding 
ratio is a composite of many different factors and inputs, which can hence change for reasons other 
than voluntary contributions. These other factors are primarily: (1) mandatory contributions, (2) 
asset returns, both of which affect the fair value of plan assets, and (3) changes in actuarial 
assumptions, which affect the PBO estimate. To the extent to which any of these other factors also 
drive changes in funding ratios over the TCJA period, our inferences on the ∆FundRatio_TCJA - 
∆%RISKY relation may not be attributable solely to TCJA-triggered voluntary contributions. To 
help attribute asset allocation shifts more clearly to TCJA-triggered voluntary contributions, we 
take two approaches. First, our base model includes controls for the other factors that also drive 
funding ratio changes: actual rates of return (𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1), discount rates (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡) 
and rates of compensation increase (𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡) – the two actuarial assumptions affecting PBO 
measurement that are disclosed on financial statements.31 Second, we modify our explanatory 
variable ∆FundRatio_TCJA to incorporate only voluntary contributions made in the TCJA window.  
Table 5, Panel B presents these results, with the explanatory variable of interest redefined 
as the change in funding ratio triggered only by voluntary contributions in the TCJA window 
(∆FundRatio_TCJA_VC). As shown in Table 2, Panel B, the average ∆FundRatio_TCJA_VC is 
 
31 Other actuarial assumptions also affect PBO measurement, such as retirement age, mortality/longevity, disability 




16%, much higher than ∆FundRatio_TCJA; this is consistent with higher discount rates and 
negative asset returns lowering ex post funding ratios over the TCJA window. The inferences are 
very similar to those from Panel A.   
Among control variables, we observe a positive and significant coefficient on broad equity 
market returns (MarketReturn), consistent with Rauh (2009), suggesting behavioral inertia or 
transaction costs to rebalancing asset allocations.  
Placing the asset allocation findings in a broader context  
 On the face of it, our findings that TCJA-triggered funding improvements lead to lower 
allocations to equities could be seen as contrary to Rauh (2009), who documents that as plans 
become better-funded, they tend to invest more in equities. Prior evidence does suggest however 
that non-linearities could exist in the relation between funding status and asset allocation – while 
moderately-funded plans could invest more in equities, very well-funded plans might not find 
equities as attractive. If funding ratios post-TCJA improve to a level that makes hibernation or 
PRT actually feasible, then we would expect to see more derisking, as we do.  
 Another possible explanation for the difference lies in the gulf between our time period 
(2013-2019) and Rauh (2009)’s (1990-2003), and in the different environment that pension 
sponsors operate in today. Many of the burdens associated with maintaining DB plans have, if 
anything, increased – e.g., mandatory funding requirements have been tightened (by the PPA 2006 
and others); pension deficits are no longer allowed to be reported off-balance sheet (from SFAS 
158); discount rates are at historic lows; PBGC premiums are rising. A market for settling DB 
pension liabilities has also developed in the US, starting from 2012, with many new insurers 
entering it over time – giving sponsors a feasible option for removing pension risks. As a result, it 




 To understand if this is the case, we rerun Eq. (2) but on a longer panel of data from 2013-
2019, augmented in the following way:  
Δ%𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑌𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 Δ%𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡  
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 _ 𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽2 ∗ ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 _ 𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴
∗ ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 _ 𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 _ 𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8
∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + +𝛽10 ∗ %𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2(𝑜𝑟, %𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽11
∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15
∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽17 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  
(3) 
Our main independent variable ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  is still calculated the same way as 
∆FundRatio_TCJA, only that it now reflects the two-year change in funding ratio for the entire 
panel of data and not only over the TCJA window. We augment the model with a 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 _ 𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴 
indicator flagging the time period examined in Eq. (2), and with an interaction 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 _ 𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴 ∗
∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡. The objective of this model is to determine whether the negative relation between 
funding improvement and risky asset allocation we observe in Table 5 is reflective of a broader 
shift in this relation over time, or is TCJA-specific. The results, documented in Table 6, are 
illuminating.  
The base coefficient on ∆FundRatio, while insignificant in some models, shows significant 
coefficients in others in a direction consistent with Rauh (2009) – i.e., increases in funding 
associate with higher allocations to risky assets (Column (6)) and lower allocations to safe assets 
(Column (8)). The 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴 indicator, however, is negative and strongly significant throughout, 
indicating lower risky assets to the tune of 4.5%-7.4% post-TCJA. The interaction 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 _ 𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴 ∗
∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  is also negatively significant in Columns (1)-(6) but positively significant in 
Columns (7)-(8), indicating 0.35%-0.46% reduction in risky assets, with a corresponding increase 




indicate that the derisking we observe from Table 5 is indeed localized around the TCJA, rather 
than reflective of a broader trend; in other words, the TCJA appears to have acted as an inflection 
point of sorts for pension risk. While it is difficult to conclusively infer why, we speculate that 
TCJA could have delivered the equivalent of a one-two punch in favour of derisking: first by 
stimulating firms to make large contributions so as to maximize tax savings, and second by 
reducing the long-term attractiveness, from a tax perspective, of maintaining a DB plan (as the tax 
shield is less valuable post-TCJA), hence turning more plans in the direction of an eventual PRT 
transaction. We examine PRT transactions next.    
Do the more responsive firms engage in more PRT transactions following TCJA passage?  
Shifting pension assets towards fixed-income investments reduces many risks associated 
with DB pensions – as plan obligations are bond-like in nature, investing plan assets in fixed-
income securities (matched by duration) can hedge interest rate risks while reducing exposure to 
equity markets. Whereas this approach retains the obligations within the plan, “pension risk 
transfer” (PRT) transactions aim to remove pension obligations from the corporate balance sheet 
altogether. While these transactions take many forms, two forms most commonly seen in the US 
are lump-sum payouts to beneficiaries and “settlements” (or “buyouts”) with insurance companies.  
In lump-sum payouts, the sponsor pays benefits in a lump-sum to specified participants 
who elect that option, where the lump-sum amount is determined by discounting the promised 
stream of future benefits to present value. In buyouts, the sponsor transfers pension obligations to 
an insurer, along with an agreed-upon amount of pension assets that reflect the buyout “price”, 
which in the recently-developing US buyout market could be up to 110% of the PBO transferred.32 
 
32 A buyout price of 110% of PBO, e.g., means that the sponsor transfers $110 in pension assets for every $100 of 





Most buyouts have only been of the inactive portion of pension obligations (owed to retirees or 
terminated participants). In both types of transactions, pension liabilities are removed from the 
sponsor’s balance sheet, and associated risks (investment risk, longevity risk, interest rate risk, etc.) 
now attach to the beneficiaries (in lump-sum payouts) or to the insurer (in buyouts).  
While news reports and white papers paint a picture of a recent wave of PRT transactions, 
we have little systematic academic evidence on them. We start by obtaining a list of PRT 
transactions by US sponsors compiled by the Pensions and Investments ("P&I”) magazine, a 
reputable source of information on and for pension funds and institutional investors. We match 
this list to Compustat and other data sources. Measuring firms’ responsiveness to the TCJA as the 
change in funding ratio (TCJA period minus the pre-period), we examine whether the more TCJA-
responsive firms (1) tend to undertake more PRT transactions following the TCJA’s passage than 
they did in the period immediately before, and (2) undertake larger, more substantive transactions. 
Lacking a formal model for drivers of PRT transactions, our analysis is exploratory and descriptive.  
In Table 7, we partition the sample into relatively high (low) change in the funding ratio 
between the post-TCJA and pre-TCJA period. In the group with relatively low change in funding 
ratio, the incidence of PRT transactions remains broadly similar before and after the passage of 
TCJA at 2% and 2.6% of the sample respectively, with the difference statistically insignificant. 
The average assets transferred in the PRT transactions, whether raw or scaled by total PBO, also 
remains insignificantly different over the pre- and post-TCJA periods. In contrast, within the group 
with relatively high change in funding ratio, the incidence of PRT transactions more than doubles, 
from 2.4% to 5.4% of the sample, and assets transferred increase from 0.2% to 1% of PBO on 
 






average for the whole sample. For those firm-years involved in a PRT transaction, average assets 
transferred rose from 12.2% to 28.8% of PBO. These differences are statistically significant, with 
the exception of raw assets transferred, where the difference is only marginally significant at p = 
0.11.33 Overall, our preliminary exploration points to a striking conclusion: the TCJA appears to 
have acted as a trigger for PRT transactions.  
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”) forms the largest US tax overhaul in decades. 
Its reduction in the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% significantly decreases tax savings on 
many allowable deductions. It is intuitive that such a tax reform would affect defined-benefit (DB) 
pension plans, to which contributions are tax-deductible and within which assets earn returns tax-
free. In this study, we examine the role played by the TCJA in altering DB pension risk; our 
evidence collectively points to the TCJA serving as a driver for increased “derisking” of DB 
pensions, through multiple channels.  
In our first set of tests, we examine pre-emptive behavior in the window of opportunity 
after the TCJA’s passage but before its reduced tax rates take effect. Gaertner, Lynch, and Vernon 
(2020) document early evidence of a surge in pension contributions in this window; examining 
these contributions deeper, we conclude that they were concentrated amongst sponsors with the 
strongest incentives to derisk their pensions. Specifically, sponsors facing larger and more 
uncertain cash contribution requirements into the future, and sponsors facing greater current 
burdens for PBGC premiums (that can be avoided by settling the pension with an insurer) are more 
likely to shore up contributions in the window of opportunity before TCJA’s effective date. 
 
33 In Table OA3 of our Online Appendix, we partition the sample into groups with high, medium, and low change in 




Similarly, firms with competing uses for cash such as paying dividends or investing in growth 
opportunities are also more likely to contribute, presumably to protect their future agendas.    
In our second set of tests examining behavior after TCJA takes effect, we document that 
the firms that are more responsive to the TCJA also engage in more derisking of their DB plans 
after the TCJA. TCJA-responsive firms not only shift pension portfolios away from risky securities 
to safe, bond-like securities but also tend to transfer pension risks off the corporate balance sheet 
altogether, through lump-sum payouts to beneficiaries or settlements with insurance companies. 
With these tests, we identify the TCJA as a trigger – or an accelerator – of two important trends 
that have swept DB pensions in the US as they reach “middle age” (Buck Consultants, 2020): 
liability-driven investing, and a recent wave of settlements and lump-sum payouts. In combination, 
these trends could fundamentally reshape the DB pension landscape in the US.  
Widespread media speculation and academic inquiry has been directed at the question of 
“who benefits” from the TCJA. That stock buybacks reached all-time highs of almost $600 billion 
in the first three quarters of 2018 (Washington Post, 2018) is often quoted as evidence that 
stockholders primarily benefited (as opposed to employees); academic studies have also failed to 
find robust evidence that wages increased post-TCJA (Bennett, Thakor, and Wang 2019). To the 
extent to which the TCJA spurred a wave of contributions to DB plans and those funds were then 
invested in safe asset classes that match pension obligations, pension beneficiaries now enjoy 
greater benefit security, i.e., a greater likelihood that promised benefits will be paid in full. To that 
extent, our findings prima facie point to DB pension participants as a heretofore-overlooked (and 
possibly unintended) beneficiary of the TCJA. However, considering that these benefits would 




possibility that the PBGC itself is the ultimate beneficiary of the improved funding and subsequent 
derisking of US corporate pensions.  
Our preliminary findings on pension risk transfer transactions add further nuance to our 
understanding of whether and how DB participants actually benefit. We find that the sponsors with 
the highest TCJA-triggered funding increases are also more likely to settle their pension 
obligations, either with insurers or by making lump-sum payouts to participants. Such settlements 
do not typically cover all beneficiaries though; they are almost exclusively targeted at retired or 
terminated-vested beneficiaries. If the increased funding is primarily used to fund these settlements 
to retired or separated employees, then these groups specifically enjoy the benefits, as opposed to 
those still actively employed with the companies sponsoring these plans. Moreover, pension risk 
transfers – whether in the form of settlements or lump-sum payments – strip participants of PBGC 
protection. Finally, settlements with insurance companies and direct lump-sum payments have 
widely differing implications for beneficiaries – the latter leaves beneficiaries responsible for 
managing investment risks and longevity risks. We believe that these questions – of whether, how, 
and which employees truly benefit from the actions documented in this study – are an important 





Comparing GLV’s Estimates and Our Estimates of TCJA-Triggered Contributions 
Calendar-Year-
End Firm 









Made in fiscal 
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Contributions in TCJA 
Period  
– Our Estimate of TCJA-
Triggered Contributions 
Lockheed 
Martin Corp $0 million $46 million $46 million $5,000 million $3896.08 million 
PEPSICO Inc $130 million $164 million $34 million $1,615 million $1313.97 million 
Kellogg Co. $26 million $31 million $5 million $270 million $229.63 million 
 
We compare our estimates of TCJA-triggered contributions with GLV’s. GLV’s measure of TCJA-triggered contributions is the 
total annual pension contribution minus the corresponding expected contribution reported in the prior year’s financial statements, i.e. 
total annual pension contribution made in 2017 minus the expected contribution reported in 2016 10-K. As a calendar year-end firm can 
make pension contributions until September 15th, 2018 (the “grace period”) and deduct those contributions from 2017’s taxable income, 
GLV’s estimates potentially omit TCJA-triggered contributions made in 2018. We provide three examples above to illustrate this point.  
Column [1] shows the expected contributions for 2017 fiscal year, which are reported in 2016 financial statements (10-Ks). Column 
[2] lists total annual pension contributions made by the sponsor in fiscal year 2017, as found in the 2017 10-Ks. Column [3] is difference 
between column [2] and column [1], representing GLV’s estimates of TCJA-triggered contributions.  
Column [4] shows annual pension contributions made in fiscal year 2018, reported on the 2018 10-K. Some of these contributions 
were made within the 2017 grace period and would hence have been deductible under the pre-TCJA tax rate; however, they are excluded 
from GLV’s estimate of TCJA-triggered contributions. Finally, column [5] is our measure of TJCA-triggered contributions using 




Lockheed Martin Corp., our first example, expected no contributions to their pension plans in 2017.34 “There were no material 
contributions to our qualified defined benefit pension plans during 2017. We will make contributions of $5.0 billion to our qualified 
defined benefit pension plans in 2018, including required and discretionary contributions”, from Lockheed Martin’s 2017 10-K. GLV’s 
measure omits the voluntary portion of this $5 billion contribution made in 2018, while our estimate (column [5]) captures the voluntary 
contribution that was made within the 2017 grace period and hence deductible at pre-TCJA tax rates.  
Similarly, PepsiCo Inc. expected to contribute $130 million to its pension plans in 2017 (column [1]). According to its 2017 10-K, 
actual annual contributions were $164 million (column [2]). In addition, PepsiCo states that “In February 2018, we received approval 
from our Board of Directors to make discretionary contributions of $1.4 billion to our U.S. pension plans in 2018 that we intend to 
invest in fixed income securities.” Under GLV’s estimate, TCJA-triggered contributions are $34 million (column [3]) while the $1.6 
billion (column [4], which includes voluntary as well as mandatory contributions), is excluded, even though it was largely contributed 
within the 2017 grace period and hence deductible at pre-TCJA tax rates.  
Kellogg Co. expected to contribute $26 million for 2017 (column [1]) but contributed $31 million in 2017 (column [2]). Applying 
GLV’s approach, TCJA-triggered contributions are $5 million (column [3]). However, in 2018, Kellogg contributed $270 million in 




34 In 2016 10-Ks, Lockheed Martin says “We do not plan to make contributions to our legacy pension plans in 2017 because none are required using current 
assumptions including investment returns on plan assets. We made $23 million in contributions during 2016 to our newly established Sikorsky pension plan and 
expect to make $45 million in contributions to this plan during 2017.” The Compustat Pension dataset ignores the $45 million expected contributions to Sikorsky 
pension plan and records 0 expected contribution. In a further complication to using Compustat Pension data, therefore, the $46 million unexpected contribution 





Variable Definitions for Main Analyses 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent Variables   
Voluntary Voluntary contributions aggregated at firm-level and scaled by lagged (firm) assets. Form 5500: Schedule SB, 
line 38a 
Mandatory Mandatory contributions made after the carryover and prefunding balances elected for use to offset 
funding requirements (aggregated at firm level) and scaled by lagged (firm) assets. 
Form 5500: Schedule SB, 
line 36 
Total Contribution Total contributions aggregated at firm-level and scaled by lagged (firm) assets. Form 5500: Schedule SB, 
line 37 
∆ (%Equity) Two-year change in percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities. Compustat Pension: pnate 
∆ (%Equity 
+ %RealEstate) 
Two-year change in percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities and real estate. Compustat Pension: pnate, 
pnatr 
∆ (%Equity + %RealEstate 
+ %Other) 
Two-year change in percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities, real estate, and other 
assets. 
Compustat Pension: pnate, 
pnatr, pnato 
∆ (%FixedIncome) Two-year change in percentage of pension assets invested in fixed income securities. Compustat Pension: pnatd 
Independent Variables   
TCJA An indicator variable equal to 1 in fiscal years ending on 03/31/2017 to 11/30/2018, and equal to 0 
in fiscal years ending before 03/31/2017. 
N/A 
Taxpayer An indicator variable equal to 1 (0) when federal tax expense plus total contributions reported on 
Form 5500 multiplying by highest statutory tax rate before the TCJA takes effect (35%) is greater 
(smaller) than zero. 
Compustat Fundamentals: 
txfed; Form 5500: 
Schedule SB, line 37 
FundRatio_5500 The actuarial value of total U.S. pension assets divided by total U.S. pension obligations under 
Form 5500. 
Form 5500: Schedule SB, 
line 2b and 3d(3) 
ActivePBO A continuous variable calculated as pension obligations owed to active participants from all 
qualified plans scaled by lagged (firm) assets. 
Form 5500: Schedule SB, 
line 3c(3) 
Beginning Firm Assets Dollar value of total firm assets at the beginning of a fiscal year. Compustat Fundamentals: 
at 
Size Natural logarithm of beginning (firm) assets.  Compustat Fundamentals: 
at 
Lev The beginning leverage, calculated as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities 






ROA Pre-tax income scaled by lagged (firm) assets. Compustat Fundamentals: 
pi 
PPE Total net amount of Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by lagged (firm) assets. Compustat Fundamentals: 
ppen 
SalesGrowth One-year change in sales scaled by lagged (firm) assets. Compustat Fundamentals: 
sale 
Post_TCJA An indicator variable equal to 1 in fiscal years ending on 12/31/2018 to 11/30/2019, and equal to 0 
in fiscal years ending before 03/31/2017.  
N/A 
FundRatio Funding ratio, measured as fair value of pension plan assets, divided by projected benefit obligation 
calculated using GAAP data (10-K). 
Compustat Pension: 
pplao, pplau, pbpro, 
pbpru 
FundRatio^2 FundRatio squared. Compustat Pension: 
pplao, pplau, pbpro, 
pbpru 
∆FundRatio Two-year change in FundRatio. Compustat Pension: 
pplao, pplau, pbpro, 
pbpru 
∆FundRatio_TCJA Change in FundRatio between the post-TCJA period and two years prior (i.e. before the beginning 
of window of opportunity). 
Compustat Pension: 
pplao, pplau, pbpro, 
pbpru 
∆FundRatio_TCJA_VC Change in GAAP funding ratio triggered by voluntary contributions made in the TCJA period, 
where voluntary contributions are compounded using discount rate on the post-TCJA 10-Ks. 
Compustat Pension: 
pplao, pplau, pbpro, 
pbpru, pbarr; Form 5500: 
Schedule SB, line 38a 
ARR Actual rate of return on plan assets. Compustat Pension: 
pbarat, pplao, pplau 
Lag_ARR Actual rate of return on plan assets in year t-1. Compustat Pension: 
pbarat, pplao, pplau 
DiscountRate Discount rate assumption used to determine the pension obligation on the balance sheet at the end 
of the year 
Compustat Pension: pbarr 
ROCI Rate of compensation increase assumption (salary growth rate). Compustat Pension: pprci 
Lag2 (%Equity) Percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities in year t-2. Compustat Pension: pnate 
Lag2 (%Equity 
+ %RealEstate) 




Percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities, real estate, and other assets in year t-2. Compustat Pension: pnate, 
pnatr, pnato 




Horizon Investment horizon, measured as natural logarithm of the ratio of projected benefit obligation 
(PBO) to accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) divided by natural logarithm of the sum of one 
plus salary growth rate. Salary growth rate is replaced with 0 if missing.  
Compustat Pension: 
pbpro, pbpru, pbaco, 
pbacu, pprci 
TaxBill Federal tax expense plus total contributions reported on 10-Ks multiplied by the highest statutory 
tax rate before the TCJA become in effect (35%), scaled by lagged (firm) assets. 
Compustat Fundamentals: 
txfed; Compustat Pension: 
pbec 
Dividend Dividends paid scaled by lagged (firm) assets. Compustat Fundamentals: 
dv 
SDCF Standard deviation of the ratio of operation cash flows to book value of equity for five years, 
ending in the current year. 
Compustat Fundamentals: 
oancf, seq 
MarketReturn 24-month returns to the S&P Global Broad Market Index for global equities. https://us.spindices.com/in
dices/equity/sp-global-
bmi-usd 
Partitioning Variables   
Underfund_pbo Difference between Form 5500 obligations and actuarial value of plan assets, scaled by form 5500 
obligations 
Form 5500: Schedule SB, 
line 2b and 3d(3) 
Underfund_assets For underfunded DB plans, this variable is equal to the difference between Form 5500 obligations 
and actuarial value of plan assets, scaled by lagged firm assets; 0 if a sponsor overfunds its DB 
plans. 
Form 5500: Schedule SB, 
line 2b and 3d(3) 
Total Participants Total number of participants in defined benefit plans sponsored by a firm. Form 5500: Schedule SB, 
line 3a(1) 
PBGC Flat Premiums PBGC flat-rate premiums paid by sponsors, calculated as number of total DB plan participants 
multiplied by PBGC premium flat rate per participant, and scaled by sales revenue. 
Form 5500: Schedule SB, 




MTB Market value of equity + book assets - stockholders' equity scaled by lagged (firm) assets. I.e. 
(prcc_f *csho + at - seq)/at(t-1) 
Compustat Fundamentals: 
prcc_f, csho, at, seq  
TobinQ Market value of equity + book assets - book value of common equity including deferred taxes 
reported on B/S, scaled by lagged (firm) assets. I.e. [prcc_f *csho + at - (ceq + ap)]/at(t-1) 
Compustat Fundamentals: 
prcc_f, csho, at, ceq, ap 
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FIGURE 1  















Figure 1 identifies Pre-TCJA, TCJA, and Post-TCJA periods in our analyses.  
The TCJA period is the treatment period for Equation (1). As the TCJA was signed into law on December 
22nd, 2017, sponsors with fiscal year ending March 31st, 2017 can make contributions (deductible from 
income for the tax year ending March 31st, 2017) up until January 15th, 2018, allowing them the time 
(albeit only about three weeks) to make contributions in response to the TCJA’s passage. For illustration, a 
firm with fiscal year-end on February 28th, 2017 only has a grace period until December 15th, 2017—which 
predates the TCJA’s passage. Hence, our window of opportunity begins with fiscal year-end dates of March 
31st, 2017. As the TCJA is effective for fiscal years beginning on and after January 1st, 2018 (i.e., ending 
on December 31st, 2018), our window of opportunity ends right before, at the fiscal year-end of November 
30th, 2018, as all contributions made by these firms still qualify for deduction at the pre-TCJA tax rate. 
Fiscal years ending December 31, 2018 and onwards, though, are not included in the window of opportunity, 
as the TCJA’s reduced tax rate becomes applicable. Therefore, fiscal years ending March 31st, 2017 to 
November 30th, 2018 comprise our treatment period for Equation (1), which we denote the “TCJA period”.  
The Post-TCJA period, which is the treatment period for Equation (2), contains observations with fiscal 
years ending on December 31st, 2018 to November 30th, 2019. The TCJA’ reduced tax rate becomes 
applicable to observations in this treatment period. 
The Pre-TCJA period, which serves as a control period for both Equations (1) & (2), contains observations 






























  n 
Panel A – Voluntary Contribution Tests  
Number of U.S.-based firm-year observations in Compustat Fundamentals datasets 
from 2013 to 2018 47,704 
   Less: observations with missing values in total assets and sales      (17,477) 
   Less: firms without observations in the TCJA period  (4,585) 
   Less: observations without ERISA-qualified pension plans  (20,911) 
   Less: observations with missing data required for Equation (1)   (846) 
  
Total firm-year observations with data on contributions 3,885 
Unique firms with ERISA-based pension plans for Equation (1)  799 
  
Panel B – Asset Allocation Tests  
Number of firm-year observations for 799 firms in Compustat Pension datasets from 
2013 to 2019 4,669 
Less: observations with fiscal year ending on 3/31/2017 to 11/30/2018             (940) 
Less: observations with missing data required for Equation (2) & (3)          (1,531) 
Less: firms without post-TCJA observations             (379) 
  
Total firm-year observations for Equation (3) 1,819 
Unique firms with ERISA-based pension plans for Equation (2) & (3) 417 
  
Table 1 shows the sample selection process for both voluntary contribution and asset allocation tests. The voluntary contribution 
test requires matching between Compustat data and Form 5500 data (ERISA-qualified plans). We follow these steps for matching:  
• First, we match the two datasets by Employer Identification Number (EIN). Unfortunately, this step does not yield a 
complete match as a firm may have several pension plans sponsored by different taxpaying divisions/subsidiaries that 
have their own EINs. Compustat lists only the EIN of the reporting entity from SEC filings.  
• In a second step, we identify the sponsors of the remaining (unmatched) pension plans and match those sponsors to 
Compustat through an extensive manual process using D&B Hoovers, SEC.gov, and Google.com.  
• We assume that if a company is a subsidiary of a Compustat firm in 2017, this company remains a subsidiary of the same 









Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Voluntary Contribution Tests 
 
Full Sample  
(N = 3,885) 
Pre – TCJA [A]  
(N = 2,930) 
TCJA [B]  
(N = 955) Difference in Means 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD [B] – [A] SE   
          
Voluntary Contribution 0.29 1.05 0.25 0.94 0.40 1.32 0.14 0.04 *** 
Voluntary Contribution 
(unscaled), $’m 39.33 208.82 34.46 167.95 54.27 301.04 19.82 7.78 ** 
Mandatory Contribution 0.14 0.41 0.14 0.42 0.13 0.37 -0.007 0.015  
Mandatory Contribution 
(unscaled), $’m 9.67 47.67 9.28 43.77 10.86 58.03 1.57 1.78  
Total Contribution 0.43 1.20 0.40 1.09 0.53 1.46 0.13 0.04 *** 
Total Contribution 
(unscaled), $’m 50.07 247.93 45.06 205.00 65.42 347.73 20.36 9.23 ** 
TCJA 0.25 0.43 0 0.00 1 0.00 1.00 -  
Taxpayer 0.85 0.36 0.86 0.35 0.84 0.37 -0.02 0.013  
FundRatio_5500 1.12 0.17 1.12 0.17 1.1182 0.169 0.00053 0.0063  
ActivePBO 3.40 4.13 3.49 4.19 3.13 3.90 -0.36 0.15 ** 
ActivePBO (unscaled), $’m 449.11 1155.16 462.19 1172.17 408.98 1100.96 -53.21 43.04  
Size (log of beginning firm 
assets) 8.50 1.74 8.51 1.74 8.46 1.75 -0.05 0.06  
Beginning Firm Assets, $'m 21948.7 57386.2 22206.6 58035.2 21157.2 55369.9 -1049.5 2138.5  
Lev 0.33 0.23 0.32 0.23 0.35 0.23 0.03 0.009 *** 
ROA 0.06 0.08 0.061 0.08 0.062 0.07 0.00084 0.0029  
PPE 0.33 0.27 0.33 0.27 0.32 0.26 -0.02 0.01 * 








Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Asset Allocation Tests 
  Sample for Eq. (2)    Sample for Eq. (3) 
  
Pre-TCJA [A] 
(N = 1402) 
Post-TCJA [B] 
(N = 417) Difference in Means  
Full Period 
(N = 1819) 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD [B] – [A] SE  Mean SD 
           
∆ (%Equity) -0.024 0.110 -0.0795 0.148 -0.055 0.0067 *** -0.037 0.122 
∆ (%Equity+ %RealEstate)  -0.022 0.112 -0.0807 0.150 -0.058 0.0068 *** -0.036 0.124 
∆ (%Equity+ %RealEstate 
+%Other)  -0.016 0.108 -0.0789 0.170 -0.063 0.007 *** -0.030 0.128 
∆ (%FixedIncome)  0.015 0.106 0.0813 0.165 0.066 0.0068 *** 0.030 0.125 
Post_TCJA 0 0 1 0 1 -   0.23 0.42 
∆FundRatio 0.025 0.10 0.037 0.07 0.012 0.005 ** 0.028 0.10 
∆FundRatio_TCJA - - 0.037 0.07 - -  - - 
∆FundRatio_TCJA_VC - - 0.16 0.34 - -   - - 
FundRatio 0.80 0.14 0.83 0.15 0.03 0.008 *** 0.81 0.14 
FundRatio^2 0.66 0.22 0.71 0.24 0.05 0.013 *** 0.67 0.23 
ARR 0.07 0.060 -0.02 0.06 -0.09 0.003 *** 0.05 0.07 
Lag_ARR 0.08 0.065 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.003 *** 0.09 0.06 
DiscountRate 4.23 0.48 3.99 0.52 -0.24 0.027 *** 4.18 0.50 
ROCI 0.030 0.02 0.027 0.02 -0.004 0.001 *** 0.03 0.02 
Lag2 (%Equity) 0.517 0.156 0.464 0.182 -0.053 0.009 *** 0.50 0.164 
Lag2 (%Equity 
+ %RealEstate) 0.534 0.159 0.483 0.186 -0.051 0.0092 *** 0.52 0.167 
Lag2 (%Equity 
+ %RealEstate+%Others) 0.596 0.152 0.570 0.180 -0.025 0.0089 *** 0.59 0.159 
Lag2 (%FixedIncome) 0.404 0.152 0.428 0.179 0.023 0.0088 *** 0.41 0.159 
Horizon 1.42 1.65 1.22 1.77 -0.20 0.094 ** 1.37 1.68 
TaxBill 0.013 0.02 0.007 0.01 -0.007 0.001 *** 0.01 0.02 
Size 8.63 1.71 8.70 1.70 0.06 0.095   8.65 1.71 
Lev 0.31 0.20 0.35 0.22 0.04 0.012 *** 0.32 0.21 
Dividend 0.0205 0.02 0.0211 0.02 0.0005 0.001   0.02 0.02 
SDCF 0.475 1.83 0.472 1.64 -0.003 0.0996   0.47 1.79 
MarketReturn 0.08 0.09 -0.07 0.06 -0.16 0.005 *** 0.05 0.11 
                    
Note: 
*, **, *** Denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for voluntary contribution tests. The sample is further partitioned by pre-TCJA and TCJA 
regime. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for asset allocation tests. The sample is further partitioned by pre-TCJA and post-
TCJA regime. Pre-TCJA observations have fiscal years ending before March 31st, 2017; TCJA observations have fiscal years ending 
on March 31st, 2017 to November 30th, 2018; and Post-TCJA observations have fiscal years ending on December 31st, 2018 to 
November 30th, 2019 (as shown in Figure 1). “SD” denotes standard deviation; “SE” denotes standard errors.  






***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using two-tailed clustered standard errors at the firm 
level. 
In panel A, the dependent variable Voluntary Contributions is voluntary contributions aggregated at firm-level and scaled by lagged 
assets. In panel B, the dependent variable Mandatory Contributions is mandatory contributions made after the carryover and 
prefunding balance elected for use to offset funding requirements (aggregated at firm level) and scaled by lagged assets. 
TCJA is an indicator variable equal to 1 in fiscal years ending on March 31st, 2017 to November 30th, 2018, and equal to 0 in fiscal 
years ending before March 31st, 2017. Taxpayer is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0) when federal tax expense plus total 
contributions reported on Form 5500 multiplied by the highest statutory tax rate (35%) is greater (equal to or lesser) than zero. 
Taxpayer*TCJA is an interactive term. All other variables are defined in Appendix B.  
TABLE 3: 
The Effect of the TCJA on Pension Contributions  
       
 Panel A Panel B 
VARIABLES VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS 
MANDATORY 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
TCJA 0.175*** -0.110 0.0765 -0.230* 0.000347 -0.00569 
 (0.0490) (0.0808) (0.102) (0.117) (0.0442) (0.0452) 
Taxpayer  0.162**  0.165**  0.0538*** 
  (0.0678)  (0.0686)  (0.0189) 
Taxpayer*TCJA  0.348***  0.355***  0.00631 
  (0.0843)  (0.0853)  (0.0251) 
FundRatio_5500 -1.490*** -1.477*** -1.963*** -1.962*** -0.824*** -0.814*** 
 (0.292) (0.280) (0.371) (0.359) (0.109) (0.106) 
ActivePBO 0.110** 0.106** 0.111** 0.108** 0.0481*** 0.0474*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0450) (0.0455) (0.0451) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
Size -0.352 -0.375 -0.380 -0.405 -0.00820 -0.0111 
 (0.384) (0.383) (0.389) (0.388) (0.0426) (0.0430) 
Lag_Lev 0.366 0.392 0.339 0.364 0.0451 0.0491 
 (0.320) (0.323) (0.319) (0.322) (0.0595) (0.0598) 
ROA 0.524 0.284 0.658 0.420 -0.180 -0.240* 
 (0.677) (0.696) (0.668) (0.688) (0.138) (0.145) 
PPE -1.089 -1.110 -1.152 -1.178 0.0158 0.0144 
 (0.966) (0.954) (0.975) (0.963) (0.0711) (0.0715) 
SalesGrowth 0.151 0.150 0.236 0.238 0.0152 0.0128 
 (0.178) (0.170) (0.174) (0.167) (0.0340) (0.0338) 
Constant 4.732 4.802 5.539 5.639 0.955** 0.928** 
 (3.460) (3.403) (3.543) (3.484) (0.398) (0.402) 
       
Observations 3,885 3,885 3,885 3,885 3,885 3,885 
R-squared 28.0% 28.8% 28.6% 29.5% 72.9% 73.1% 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Drivers of Voluntary Contributions in the TCJA Window 
Panel A – Plan-level Characteristics 
 Pension Funding Status 
Uncertainty 
in Benefit 
Payouts PBGC Premium Costs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






       
TCJA -0.00883 0.0351 -0.0395 0.0135 -0.0137 
 (0.111) (0.105) (0.102) (0.103) (0.106) 
High Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
      
TCJA*High 0.209*** 0.215** 0.238*** 0.138* 0.203*** 
 (0.0643) (0.0912) (0.0659) (0.0714) (0.0677) 
Taxpayer 0.278*** 0.265*** 0.285*** 0.263*** 0.268*** 
 (0.0714) (0.0679) (0.0745) (0.0678) (0.0681) 
FundRatio_5500  -1.847*** -1.879*** -1.897*** -1.898*** 
  (0.354) (0.365) (0.357) (0.357) 
ActivePBO 0.108** 0.108**  0.108** 0.112** 
 (0.0444) (0.0447)  (0.0448) (0.0447) 
Size -0.438 -0.402 -0.639 -0.394 -0.376 
 (0.390) (0.389) (0.511) (0.392) (0.393) 
Lag_Lev 0.395 0.375 0.340 0.362 0.356 
 (0.324) (0.323) (0.333) (0.324) (0.325) 
ROA 0.0594 0.260 0.263 0.298 0.285 
 (0.669) (0.676) (0.728) (0.684) (0.687) 
PPE -1.187 -1.118 -1.031 -1.124 -1.160 
 (0.968) (0.961) (0.925) (0.964) (0.959) 
SalesGrowth 0.220 0.199 0.163 0.196 0.199 
 (0.176) (0.169) (0.168) (0.169) (0.170) 
Constant 3.632 5.373 7.759* 5.372 5.215 
 (3.411) (3.503) (4.649) (3.532) (3.540) 
      
Observations 3,859 3,859 3,859 3,859 3,854 
R-squared 20.0% 21.4% 20.2% 21.3% 21.5% 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean of Partition 
Variable  -0.0012 0.0117 5.9460 37964.74 309.7186 
for High (Low) 
Subsample (-0.2663) (0) (0.7555) (1795.29) (53.6237) 
t-statistics for difference 
between High and Low 




























***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using two-tailed clustered standard errors at the firm 
level. We partition the sample on variables that capture the incentives to voluntarily contribute to DB plans. In Panel A, the sample 
is partitioned by plan characteristics, using a median split of underfunded obligations relative to total pension obligations 
(Underfund_pbo), underfunded obligations relative to firm size (Underfund_assets), proportion of the obligation owed to active 
participants, total number of participants, and PBGC flat premiums respectively in Columns (1)-(5). In Panel B, the sample is 
partitioned by firm-level characteristics, using a median split of market to book (MTB), Tobin’s Q (TobinQ), and dividends paid 
(Dividend), in Columns (1)-(3). We estimate Equation (1) and include an indicator variable High equal to 1(0) if a firm’s value of 
partitioning variable is above (below) the median and an interactive term between TCJA and High. Voluntary Contributions is the 
dependent variable, defined as voluntary contributions aggregated at firm-level and scaled by lagged assets. TCJA is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 in fiscal years ending between March 31st, 2017 and November 30th, 2018, and equal to 0 in fiscal years ending 
before March 31st, 2017. The variable of interest, TCJA*High, is an interactive term. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
B. 
Panel B – Sponsor-level Characteristics 
 Investment Opportunities Alternate uses of cash 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  MTB Tobin’s Q Dividend 
     
TCJA -0.0799 -0.0731 -0.0152 
 (0.108) (0.110) (0.112) 
High Omitted Omitted Omitted 
    
TCJA*High 0.301*** 0.287*** 0.185*** 
 (0.0972) (0.101) (0.0665) 
Taxpayer 0.282*** 0.286*** 0.258*** 
 (0.0743) (0.0766) (0.0676) 
FundRatio_5500 -1.984*** -1.968*** -1.918*** 
 (0.379) (0.395) (0.361) 
ActivePBO 0.111** 0.110** 0.106** 
 (0.0449) (0.0467) (0.0440) 
Size -0.450 -0.427 -0.416 
 (0.404) (0.419) (0.395) 
Lag_Lev 0.294 0.250 0.351 
 (0.311) (0.320) (0.323) 
ROA 0.151 0.0703 0.314 
 (0.704) (0.736) (0.671) 
PPE -1.232 -1.247 -1.167 
 (1.016) (1.041) (0.966) 
SalesGrowth 0.216 0.232 0.185 
 (0.177) (0.191) (0.168) 
Constant 5.960 5.747 5.607 
 (3.650) (3.766) (3.564) 
    
Observations 3,569 3,402 3,844 
R-squared 21.4% 21.3% 21.4% 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE by Firm Yes Yes Yes 
Mean of Partition Variable  2.5330 2.4989 0.0381 
for High (Low) Subsample (1.1837) (1.1390) (0.0039) 
t-statistics for difference between 





TCJA-Triggered Funding Changes and Shifts in Asset Allocation  
Panel A: Change in Funding Ratio between Pre-TCJA and Post-TCJA Period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




∆ (%Equity + 
%RealEstate+ 
%Other) ∆%FixedIncome 
     
∆FundRatio_TCJA -0.342** -0.353** -0.402** 0.405** 
 (0.138) (0.141) (0.166) (0.165) 
FundRatio -0.310 -0.266 -0.271 0.318 
 (0.460) (0.458) (0.500) (0.494) 
FundRatio^2 0.133 0.107 0.147 -0.179 
 (0.285) (0.284) (0.312) (0.307) 
ARR -1.701*** -1.713*** -2.042*** 2.082*** 
 (0.341) (0.345) (0.388) (0.385) 
Lag_ARR -0.223 -0.275 -0.304 0.492 
 (0.307) (0.314) (0.451) (0.415) 
DiscountRate 0.0186 0.0156 -0.0118 0.00921 
 (0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
ROCI -0.105 0.00818 0.676 -0.657 
 (0.484) (0.492) (0.589) (0.586) 
Lag2 (%Equity) -0.241***    
 (0.0431)    
Lag2 (%Equity 
+ %RealEstate)  -0.223***   
  (0.0416)   
Lag2 (%Equity 
+ %RealEstate+%Other)   -0.175***  
   (0.0651)  
Lag2 (%FixedIncome)    -0.136*** 
    (0.0514) 
Horizon 0.00117 0.000867 -0.000984 0.000960 
 (0.00277) (0.00277) (0.00306) (0.00310) 
TaxBill 1.005 1.058 1.799** -1.737** 
 (0.688) (0.710) (0.818) (0.820) 
Size 0.00228 0.00309 0.00708 -0.00611 
 (0.00445) (0.00450) (0.00557) (0.00548) 
Lev 0.0317 0.0353 0.0511* -0.0574** 
 (0.0263) (0.0264) (0.0288) (0.0281) 
Dividend -0.314 -0.349 -0.437 0.404 
 (0.329) (0.334) (0.368) (0.367) 
SDCF 0.00775** 0.00908** 0.00868** -0.00941** 
 (0.00374) (0.00407) (0.00370) (0.00366) 
MarketReturn 1.722*** 1.657*** 1.706*** -1.654*** 
 (0.329) (0.325) (0.363) (0.363) 
Constant 0.223 0.202 0.225 -0.0940 
 (0.191) (0.189) (0.218) (0.213) 
     
Observations 417 417 417 417 
R-squared 25.8% 25.0% 20.8% 20.8% 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No 




Panel B: Change in Funding Ratio Triggered by Voluntary Contribution in the TCJA Period 




∆ (%Equity + 
%RealEstate+ 
%Other) ∆%FixedIncome 
     
∆FundRatio_TCJA_VC -0.0925*** -0.0941*** -0.0814** 0.0839** 
 (0.0295) (0.0301) (0.0414) (0.0400) 
FundRatio -0.426 -0.381 -0.342 0.394 
 (0.429) (0.429) (0.473) (0.467) 
FundRatio^2 0.185 0.158 0.163 -0.198 
 (0.264) (0.264) (0.294) (0.289) 
ARR -1.675*** -1.686*** -2.041*** 2.079*** 
 (0.346) (0.352) (0.417) (0.412) 
Lag_ARR -0.498* -0.549* -0.584 0.777* 
 (0.299) (0.308) (0.441) (0.405) 
DiscountRate 0.0303** 0.0276* -0.00117 -0.00178 
 (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0187) (0.0186) 
ROCI -0.114 0.00225 0.690 -0.669 
 (0.494) (0.501) (0.615) (0.611) 
Lag (%Equity) -0.253***    
 (0.0418)    
Lag (%Equity + %RealEstate)  -0.237***   
  (0.0404)   
Lag (%Equity 
+ %RealEstate+%Other)   -0.185***  
   (0.0671)  
Lag (%FixedIncome)    -0.146*** 
    (0.0540) 
Horizon 0.000262 -0.0000684 -0.00195 0.00194 
 (0.00265) (0.00266) (0.00314) (0.00319) 
TaxBill 0.617 0.658 1.343 -1.278 
 (0.698) (0.720) (0.831) (0.834) 
Size -0.000508 0.000256 0.00487 -0.00383 
 (0.00444) (0.00452) (0.00534) (0.00526) 
Lag_Lev 0.0279 0.0316 0.0495 -0.0556* 
 (0.0263) (0.0266) (0.0302) (0.0296) 
Dividend -0.297 -0.332 -0.397 0.365 
 (0.335) (0.340) (0.376) (0.375) 
SDCF 0.00695* 0.00824** 0.00744** -0.00819** 
 (0.00382) (0.00418) (0.00352) (0.00348) 
MarketReturn 1.521*** 1.455*** 1.528*** -1.471*** 
 (0.323) (0.317) (0.375) (0.373) 




 (0.175) (0.175) (0.202) (0.200) 
     
Observations 417 417 417 417 
R-squared 27.3% 26.5% 20.8% 20.9% 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No 
Robust SE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using two-tailed clustered standard errors at the firm 
level. We estimate Equation (2) in Table 5. The variable of interest in Panel A is ∆FundRatio_TCJA, calculated as the change in 
GAAP funding ratio between the post-TCJA period and two years prior. The variable of interest in Panel B is 
∆FundRatio_TCJA_VC, calculated as the change in GAAP funding ratio triggered by voluntary contributions made in the TCJA 
period, where voluntary contributions are compounded by discount rate assumption reported on the post-TCJA 10-Ks. In column 
(1), the dependent variable ∆%Equity is change in percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities between the post-TCJA 
period and two years prior (i.e., before the start of the window of opportunity). In column (2), the dependent variable ∆ 
(%Equity+ %RealEstate) is change in percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities and real estate between the post-
TCJA period and two years prior (i.e., before the start of the window of opportunity). In column (3), the dependent variable ∆ 
(%Equity+ %RealEstate+%Other) is change in percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities, real estate, and other 
assets between the post-TCJA period and two years prior (i.e., before the start of the window of opportunity). In column (4), the 
dependent variable ∆ (%FixedIncome) is change in percentage of pension assets invested in fixed income securities between the 










Table 6  
The Relation Between Pension Funding and Asset Allocation over Pre- and Post-TCJA periods 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
 ∆%RISKY  ∆%SAFE 
VARIABLES ∆%Equity  
∆ (%Equity 
+ %RealEstate)  
∆ (%Equity 
+ %RealEstate 
+ %Other)  ∆ %FixedIncome 
             
Post_TCJA -0.0744*** -0.0560***  -0.0762*** -0.0594***  -0.0665*** -0.0445**  0.0693*** 0.0487*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0169)  (0.0206) (0.0170)  (0.0207) (0.0172)  (0.0207) (0.0169) 
∆FundRatio -0.0300 0.0829  -0.0285 0.0849  -0.0271 0.105*  0.0222 -0.114** 
 (0.0658) (0.0600)  (0.0669) (0.0606)  (0.0563) (0.0567)  (0.0565) (0.0569) 
Post_TCJA*∆FundRatio -0.405** -0.449***  -0.416** -0.460***  -0.454** -0.354**  0.458** 0.352** 
 (0.166) (0.156)  (0.168) (0.158)  (0.179) (0.179)  (0.179) (0.179) 
FundRatio -0.258 0.130  -0.198 0.107  -0.248 0.191  0.241 -0.196 
 (0.210) (0.366)  (0.211) (0.375)  (0.215) (0.359)  (0.213) (0.357) 
FundRatio^2 0.124 -0.185  0.0870 -0.174  0.139 -0.284  -0.136 0.291 
 (0.137) (0.227)  (0.137) (0.232)  (0.140) (0.225)  (0.139) (0.224) 
ARR 0.110 -0.0113  0.0960 -0.0204  -0.00139 -0.0317  0.00283 0.0335 
 (0.0898) (0.101)  (0.0910) (0.102)  (0.0911) (0.0991)  (0.0908) (0.0994) 
Lag_ARR 0.261*** 0.0545  0.243*** 0.0486  0.172* -0.0200  -0.150* 0.0305 
 (0.0855) (0.0791)  (0.0860) (0.0789)  (0.0895) (0.0785)  (0.0867) (0.0783) 
DiscountRate 0.0175** 0.0299**  0.0182** 0.0312**  0.0115 0.0358***  -0.0112 -0.0358*** 
 (0.00795) (0.0126)  (0.00797) (0.0130)  (0.00861) (0.0137)  (0.00855) (0.0136) 
ROCI -0.223 0.0628  -0.176 0.0155  0.129 0.0469  -0.122 -0.0696 
 (0.257) (0.595)  (0.266) (0.606)  (0.278) (0.583)  (0.276) (0.581) 
Lag2 (%Equity) -0.210*** -0.905***          
 (0.0243) (0.0413)          
Lag 2(%Equity + %RealEstate)    -0.198*** -0.902***       
    (0.0241) (0.0407)       
Lag2 (%Equity + %RealEstate+%Other)       -0.170*** -0.903***    




Lag2 (%FixedIncome)          -0.158*** -0.871*** 
          (0.0243) (0.0470) 
Horizon 0.00503*** -0.00198  0.00460** -0.00230  0.00450** -0.00139  -0.00450** 0.00100 
 (0.00177) (0.00372)  (0.00179) (0.00371)  (0.00216) (0.00509)  (0.00215) (0.00507) 
TaxBill 0.102 0.0710  0.122 0.0970  -0.0202 0.0754  0.0418 0.0300 
 (0.226) (0.304)  (0.233) (0.293)  (0.238) (0.317)  (0.236) (0.309) 
Size -0.00326 0.00899  -0.00272 0.00608  -0.00224 0.000170  0.00210 0.00137 
 (0.00222) (0.0123)  (0.00223) (0.0126)  (0.00233) (0.0137)  (0.00232) (0.0135) 
Lag_Lev 0.0169 0.0162  0.0180 0.0157  0.0147 0.0171  -0.0143 -0.0170 
 (0.0146) (0.0194)  (0.0149) (0.0194)  (0.0150) (0.0211)  (0.0150) (0.0211) 
Dividend -0.0108 -0.272  -0.0415 -0.302  -0.0114 -0.487  0.00389 0.437 
 (0.175) (0.299)  (0.176) (0.296)  (0.185) (0.302)  (0.184) (0.299) 
SDCF -0.0000939 -0.00221  0.000339 -0.00454**  0.0000658 -0.00103  -0.000115 0.00107 
 (0.00195) (0.00156)  (0.00206) (0.00203)  (0.00179) (0.00217)  (0.00178) (0.00218) 
MarketReturn 0.184*** 0.0998*  0.173*** 0.0903*  0.199*** 0.0983**  -0.200*** -0.103** 
 (0.0567) (0.0511)  (0.0575) (0.0515)  (0.0581) (0.0476)  (0.0580) (0.0475) 
Trend 0.0161*** 0.000206  0.0156*** 0.000675  0.0123** 0.00135  -0.0126** -0.00250 
 (0.00550) (0.00500)  (0.00556) (0.00503)  (0.00579) (0.00498)  (0.00581) (0.00491) 
Constant 0.0723 0.243  0.0442 0.293  0.0876 0.396**  0.0785 0.482*** 
 (0.0794) (0.180)  (0.0800) (0.193)  (0.0870) (0.179)  (0.0869) (0.176) 
            
Observations 1,819 1,819  1,819 1,819  1,819 1,819  1,819 1,819 
R-squared 13.9% 50.3%  13.3% 50.9%  11.9% 49.3%  12.2% 49.9% 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No  No No  No No  No No 
Clustered SE by Firm Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Note: 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using two-tailed clustered standard errors at the firm level. 
In column (1) – (2), the dependent variable ∆%Equity is two-year change in percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities. In column (3) – (4), the dependent variable ∆ 
(%Equity+ %RealEstate) is two-year change in percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities and real estate. In column (5) – (6), the dependent variable ∆ 
(%Equity+ %RealEstate+%Other) is two-year change in percentage of pension assets invested in equity securities, real estate, and other assets. In column (7) – (8), the dependent 
variable ∆ (%FixedIncome) is two-year change in percentage of pension assets invested in fixed income securities. Post-TCJA is an indicator variable equal to 1 in fiscal years ending 
between December 31st, 2018 and November 30th, 2019, and equal to 0 in fiscal years ending before March 31st, 2017. ∆FundRatio is two-year change in FundRatio. 





                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
TABLE 7 
TCJA-Triggered Funding Changes and PRT Transactions: Univariate Analyses 
 
Difference in Means by Subgroup 
 
Before TCJA was Signed [A] After TCJA was Signed [B] Difference in Means 
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD [B] – [A] SE t 
           
Sponsors that are less responsive to the TCJA (1)        
Number of PRT completed 1991 0.020 0.156 721 0.026 0.184 0.007 0.007 0.950  
Assets Transferred (unscaled) $’m 1977 5.721 86.476 720 11.678 225.503 5.957 6.008 0.992  
Assets Transferred scaled by PBO 1968 0.002 0.021 720 0.003 0.028 0.001 0.001 1.388  
Assets Transferred (unscaled) for 
observations involved in PRT  20 565.524 666.689 15 560.533 1510.615 -4.990 377.891 -0.013  
Assets Transferred (scaled by PBO) 
for observations involved in PRT  20 0.152 0.143 15 0.140 0.136 -0.012 0.048 -0.247  
           
Sponsors that are more responsive to the TCJA (2)        
Number of PRT completed 2013 0.024 0.168 734 0.054 0.290 0.031 0.009 3.419 *** 
Assets Transferred (unscaled) $’m 2001 31.756 771.474 731 34.941 285.218 3.185 29.241 0.109  
Assets Transferred scaled by PBO 1998 0.002 0.020 731 0.010 0.076 0.008 0.002 4.562 *** 
Assets Transferred (unscaled) for 
observations involved in PRT  31 2049.793 5950.104 27 946.004 1178.570 -1103.789 1165.744 -0.947  
Assets Transferred (scaled by PBO) 
for observations involved in PRT  31 0.122 0.113 27 0.281 0.288 0.159 0.056 2.834 *** 
 
Difference-in-Differences    
 
 (2) vs. (1) 
 
Variable DiD SE t  
Number of PRT completed 0.028 0.013 2.202 ** 
Assets Transferred (unscaled) $’m 23.264 13.511 1.722 * 
Assets Transferred scaled by PBO 0.007 0.003 2.480 ** 





Difference-in-Differences (Continued)   
 
 (2) vs. (1) 
 
Variable DiD SE t  
Assets Transferred (unscaled) for 
observations involved in PRT  385.470 420.068 0.918  
Assets Transferred (scaled by PBO) 
observations involved in PRT  0.141 0.079 1.781 * 
Note: 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
The TCJA was signed on December 22nd, 2017. We partition the sample by responsiveness of sponsors to the TCJA. Responsiveness of sponsors to the TCJA is captured by change 
in funding ratio between the post-TCJA period and the signing of TCJA (∆FundRatio_TCJA). Sponsors that are less responsive to the TCJA are those ranking below the median 
value of ∆FundRatio while sponsors that are more responsive to the TCJA are those ranking above the median value of ∆FundRatio. “Number of PRT completed” describes an 
indicator variable set to one if a PRT transaction was completed, and to zero if not. “Assets transferred (unscaled) $’m” describes the value of pension assets transferred in the PRT 
transaction, with the value set to zero for firm-years with no PRT. “Assets transferred scaled by PBO” describes the value of pension assets transferred in the PRT transaction / 
beginning-of-year PBO, with the value set to zero for firm-years with no PRT.   
ONLINE APPENDIX  
Note: 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using two-tailed clustered standard errors at the firm 
level. 
This table replicates our model from Table 3, Panels A-B, but without firm or year fixed-effects, to compare our estimates of TCJA-
triggered contributions to GLV’s lower bound estimates. In column (1) – (3), the dependent variable Voluntary Contributions is 
voluntary contributions aggregated at firm-level and scaled by lagged assets. In column (4) – (6), the dependent variable Mandatory 
Contributions is mandatory contributions made after the carryover and prefunding balance elected for use to offset funding 
requirements (aggregated at firm level) and scaled by lagged assets. 
TCJA is an indicator variable equal to 1 in fiscal years ending on March 31st, 2017 to November 30th, 2018, and equal to 0 in fiscal 
years ending before March 31st, 2017. Taxpayer is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0) when federal tax expense plus total 
contributions reported on Form 5500 multiplied by the highest statutory tax rate (35%) is greater (equal to or lesser) than zero. The 
variable of interest, Taxpayer*TCJA, is an interactive term. All other variables are defined in Appendix B.  
 
 
TABLE OA1  
The Effect of the TCJA on Pension Contributions – No Fixed Effects 
       
VARIABLES VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS MANDATORY CONTRIBUTIONS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
             
TCJA 0.153*** 0.156*** -0.0747** 0.00209 0.00414 0.0583 
 (0.0533) (0.0533) (0.0329) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0416) 
Taxpayer  0.125*** 0.0514  0.0779*** 0.0951*** 
  (0.0273) (0.0314)  (0.0189) (0.0268) 
Taxpayer*TCJA   0.274***   -0.0642 
   (0.0646)   (0.0504) 
FundRatio_5500 -0.270** -0.254** -0.257** -0.717*** -0.707*** -0.706*** 
 (0.106) (0.108) (0.108) (0.0806) (0.0792) (0.0789) 
ActivePBO 0.0716*** 0.0710*** 0.0714*** 0.0294*** 0.0290*** 0.0290*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.00440) (0.00438) (0.00438) 
Size -0.0151 -0.0156 -0.0154 -0.0294*** -0.0297*** -0.0297*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) 
Lag_Lev 0.0762 0.0775 0.0776 0.0258 0.0266 0.0265 
 (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) (0.0536) (0.0535) (0.0535) 
ROA 1.205** 1.063* 1.069* -0.448* -0.537** -0.538** 
 (0.577) (0.598) (0.599) (0.241) (0.254) (0.254) 
PPE -0.114 -0.0970 -0.0977 0.00217 0.0127 0.0129 
 (0.0847) (0.0829) (0.0831) (0.0276) (0.0281) (0.0280) 
SalesGrowth 0.246 0.227 0.236 0.00612 -0.00561 -0.00783 
 (0.282) (0.281) (0.279) (0.0614) (0.0608) (0.0606) 
Constant 0.373* 0.257 0.320 1.106*** 1.034*** 1.019*** 
 (0.209) (0.209) (0.212) (0.177) (0.167) (0.159) 
       
Observations 3,885 3,885 3,885 3,885 3,885 3,885 
R-squared 9.9% 10.1% 10.3% 22.9% 23.3% 23.3% 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No No 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No 
Clustered SE by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
TABLE OA2 
Estimates of TCJA-Triggered Contributions for comparison with GLV  
  
No Fixed Effects 
(Table OA1, col 1 
estimates) 
Firm Fixed Effects, 
NO Year Fixed 
Effects 
(Table 3, col 1 
estimates) 
Coefficient on TCJA  0.153 percent 0.175 percent 
Our Estimates of Average TCJA-Triggered 
Contributions = [Coefficient on TCJA * Pre-TCJA 
mean of total assets1]  
0.153 percent * 
$22,206 million =  
$33.97 million 
0.175 percent * 







Total TCJA-Triggered Contributions 
from 391 observations in the TCJA 
period  
$33.97 million*391 
= $13.28 billion 
$38.86 million*391 
= $15.19 billion 
  
This table provides the calculations for estimating TCJA-triggered contributions using our approximation of GLV’s sample and 
our full sample for comparison. GLV’s estimates of total TCJA-triggered contributions are based on models with no fixed effects 
and with firm (but no year) fixed effects. We apply GLV’s sample selection criteria to all observations in Compustat Pension 
database. This yields a total of 1465 observations across 391 firms, with 391 observations in the TCJA period. The original GLV 









Univariate Difference-in-Differences Tests on PRT Transactions – Three Groups 
 
Difference in Means by Subgroup 
 
Before TCJA was Signed [A] After TCJA was Signed [B] Difference in Means 
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD [B] – [A] SE t 
           
Sponsors that are least responsive to the TCJA (1)        
Number of PRT completed 1323 0.018 0.159 483 0.023 0.175 0.005 0.009 0.533  
Assets Transferred (unscaled) $’m 1318 6.083 92.495 482 14.639 274.062 8.556 8.642 0.990  
Assets Transferred scaled by PBO 1309 0.002 0.023 482 0.003 0.025 0.001 0.001 0.817  
Assets Transferred (unscaled) for 
observations involved in PRT  14 572.641 719.260 8 882 2070.469 309.359 600.644 0.515  
Assets Transferred (scaled by PBO) 
observations involved in PRT  14 0.161 0.160 8 0.165 0.111 0.004 0.064 0.070  
           
Sponsors that are moderately responsive to the TCJA (2)        
Number of PRT completed 1344 0.022 0.153 480 0.048 0.266 0.026 0.010 2.544 ** 
Assets Transferred (unscaled) $’m 1329 6.971 127.772 480 21.533 220.656 14.562 8.404 1.733 * 
Assets Transferred scaled by PBO 1329 0.001 0.017 480 0.007 0.059 0.006 0.002 3.340 *** 
Assets Transferred (unscaled) for 
observations involved in PRT  14 661.750 1095.950 18 574.217 1017.769 -87.533 375.007 -0.233  
Assets Transferred (scaled by PBO) 
observations involved in PRT  14 0.115 0.124 18 0.192 0.244 0.076 0.072 1.063  
           
Sponsors that are most responsive to the TCJA (3)        
Number of PRT completed 1337 0.025 0.173 492 0.051 0.277 0.026 0.011 2.400 ** 
Assets Transferred (unscaled) $’m 1331 43.255 938.585 489 33.861 273.867 -9.394 43.110 -0.218  
Assets Transferred scaled by PBO 1328 0.002 0.021 489 0.010 0.076 0.008 0.002 3.410 *** 
Assets Transferred (unscaled) for 
observations involved in PRT  23 2503.155 6842.481 16 1034.887 1155.459 -1468.27 1734.258 -0.847  
Assets Transferred (scaled by PBO) 
observations involved in PRT  23 0.129 0.102 16 0.307 0.300 0.179 0.067 2.654 ** 
 
Difference-in-Differences        
 (3) vs. (1)  (3) vs. (2) 
Variable DiD SE t  DiD SE t 
Number of PRT completed 0.028 0.015 1.885 * 0.003 0.017 0.166 
Assets Transferred (unscaled) $’m 19.222 17.584 1.093  12.328 15.995 0.771 
Assets Transferred scaled by PBO 0.007 0.004 2.009 ** 0.003 0.004 0.656 
Assets Transferred (unscaled) for 
observations involved in PRT  152.888 653.014 0.234  460.671 372.622 1.236 
Assets Transferred (scaled by PBO) 
observations involved in PRT  0.142 0.111 1.282  0.116 0.093 1.237 
Note: 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
The TCJA was signed on December 22nd, 2017. We partition the sample by responsiveness of sponsors to the TCJA. Responsiveness of sponsors to the TCJA is captured by the 
change in funding ratio between post-TCJA and pre-TCJA period (∆FundRatio_GAAP). Sponsors that are least responsive to the TCJA are those ranking in the lowest tercile of 
∆FundRatio_GAAP while sponsors that are moderately responsive are those ranking in the middle tercile, and sponsors that are most responsive to the TCJA are those ranking in 
the highest tercile of ∆FundRatio_GAAP. “Number of PRT completed” describes an indicator variable set to one if a PRT transaction was completed, and to zero if not. “Assets 
transferred (unscaled) $’m” describes the value of pension assets transferred in the PRT transaction, with the value set to zero for firm-years with no PRT. “Assets transferred scaled 
by PBO” describes the value of pension assets transferred in the PRT transaction / beginning-of-year PBO, with the value set to zero for firm-years with no PRT.   
 
 
 
 
 
